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The question of whether or not the Secretary of the
Interior may administratively cancel outstanding oil and gas
leases on the public lands was rather recently brought into
focus by the case of Pan American Petroleum Corp. v.
Pierson , wherein Judge Breitenstein said:
' "The Secretary of the Interior has no
powers except those granted or those
necessarily implied from granted
powers. . . . The courts have repeatedly
held that he is without power to annul
a patent once it has issued. Tliat power
is reserved to the courts . In the absence
of some statutory provision giving him
power to annul leases under the Mineral
Leasing Act, that power is also reserved
to the courts. Otherwise the new system
created by the Mineral Leasing Act for
the disposition of the mineral reserves
found oh the public lands fails of its
purpose. Certainty of title is an elementary
prerequisite for the sound development of any
mineral resource." 1
The problem has been with us for several years, and
although it has been before the courts only infrequently, it
assumes considerable importance due to the large amount of
acreage held under federal oil and gas leases. In its
petition to the Supreme Court in the Pierson ^ case, the
government stated that as of ". . . June :>0, 1960, there were
outstanding 139,000 leases supervised by t.ha Department of
Interior under the Mineral Leasing Act of iv20, . . .
1. 284 F. 2d 649, 655 (10th Cir. 1960), cert, denied , 366
U.S. 936 (1961)
2. Petition for certiorari, Pan American Petroleum Corp.
v. Pierson, 366 U. S. 936 (1961)
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vhich covered 113,000,000 acres. The total nximber of
outstanding leases supervised by the Department under all
programs--publie lands, acquired lands, Indian, Naval
Petroleum Reserve, and Outer Continental Shel£--wa8
159,000, covering 125,000,000 acres." ^
Between the passage of the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920 ^ and 1938, the Secretary of the Interior made no attempt
to cancel leases by administrative action. Indeed, in 1930
he expressed the opinion that he was without power to cancel
an outstanding lease except through court proceedings insti-
tuted by the Attorney General. ^ In 1938, however, he took
the position that he had the power to determine whether or
not title to the leasehold passed out of the United States
upon Issuance of the lease. If he concluded that it did
not, he further reasoned "there is no reason why the
Department should not have authority to cancel such a lease
Just the same as If it had been a prospecting permit." ^
From 1938 to the present, oil and gas leases covering
untold thousands of acres of the public lands have been
cancelled by administrative action. In a case now pending
before the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, the government stated in Its brief that in the
3. Id at 10
4. Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30
U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1958) (hereinafter called the Leasing
Act)
5. Mellsh Consolidated Placer Oil Mining Co. v. Testerman,
53 I.D. 205 (1930)
6. Fenelon Boesche, A21230 (Feb. 21, 1938) (unpublished)
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three year period ending June 30, 1960, the Department
had administratively cancelled 1,129 oil and gas leases.
That the Secretary has been challenged in the courts as
rarely as he has is probably due to the fact that most of
the leases involved wildcat acreage which would not justify
the costs of litigation.
In considering the problem it is important to note the
cases in which the power has been given consideration by the
courts. In Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Wilbur ® it was stated that
the Secretary did not possess the power, under the terms of
the Leasing Act , to cancel an oil and gas lease on public '
lands by administrative action. McKay v. Wahlenmaier . 9
decided in 1955, and by the same court but without reference
to the Bell case, suggests the contrary. In that case the
court stated:
"The Secretary's decision (not to cancel the
lease) was probably based on confusion as
to the nature of the question before him,
and misapprehension of his own power and
duty to cancel a lease obtained as this
one was . ""-^ (Emphasis supplied)
However, in 1957 the same court decided Seaton v. The Texas
Company ^^ in which it had occasion to consider the question
of whether or not the Secretary had the power to order
cancellation of a prior lease on the grounds the lease was
7. Brief for Appellee, p. 16, Boesche's Administrator v.
Udall, Civ. No. 16,238, (D.C. Cir., April 16, 1961)
8. 50 F. 2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1931)
9. 226 F. 2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
10. Id at 47
11. Seaton v. The Texas Company, Civil No. 13636 (D.C. dr.,
October 3, 1957) (Withdrawn) . See note 13 infra . The op-
inion is set forth in full in Appendix I.
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; !' issued under the wrong statute. In the first opinion, which
i:i;o the court later withdrew, and which was never published, the
court eqOated the issuance of an oil and gas lease to the
issuance of a patent and held that the lease could only be
cancelled through judicial proceedings. The Wahlenmaier case
was distinguished on the grounds that cancellation in that
case was ordered by the court and the Secretary was merely
12
carrying out the order of the court. When the court
issued its published opinion it merely held that the action
of the Secretary was not "valid administrative action." In
the disposition of the case the court said:
"If the cancellation of the Dorough lease
was not permissible under the principles
laid down in the land patent cases is
should be set aside. If cancellation
was not permissible as valid administra-
tive action of the Secretary it should
be set aside. We think it was not valid
administrative action. This makes it un-
necessary to cope with the applicability "
of the land patent cases , and we accord-
ingly withdraw our opinion of October 3,
1957." 13
Clearly, the court did not retreat from the position it took
in the withdrawn opinion. Rather it decided the case on alter-
native grounds which avoided the larger issue.
This was the status of the law when Pan American
Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson ^^ was decided. That case met the
12. Id at 7
'
13. Seaton v. The Texas Company, 256 F.2d 718,721 (D.C. Cir.
1958)
14. See note 1 supra
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issue head-on and, like the withdravm opinion in The
Texas Company case, equated the issuance of a lease to
the issuance of a land patent
.
It would appear the Secretary might have become a bit
reluctant to attempt to exercise this alleged power in view
of these interpretations of his position under the Leasing
Act« especially after the Supreme Court's refusal of
certiorari in the Pan American case. Such has not been the
case, however. He is now asserting the power in Boesche '
s
Administrator v, Udall to cancel a lease which was issued
in violation of a mere Secretarial regulation for convenient
administration of his duties under the Leasing Act , which
required an offer to lease lands on a noncompetitive basis
to include all surrounding land available for leasing, if
17
such available lands cover less than 640 acres.
The foregoing cases will later be examined in detail,
but as above stated suffice for the purpose of framing the
issues which currently exist. It is the purpose of this
paper to explore the problem in terms of the statutory
history of the Leasing Act and the decisions involving
reference to the land patent cases, two of which have
considered those cases analogous precedents so far as the
15. See note 11 supra
16. See note 7 supra
17. 43 CFR 192.42(d) (Supp 1960)
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oil and gas lease is concerned. Some inquiry will also be
made into the nature o£ the oil and gas lease in determining
the validity of the land patent analogy, as well as into
the administrative law problem which of necessity is
connected with this inquiry,
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
An understanding of the present requires some examina-
tion of the past, and a brief review of the development of
laws governing disposal of mineral resources on the public
lands is essential to an understanding of the underlying
philosophy of the recent cases which have equated the
issuance of a mineral lease to the issuance of a fee patent.
The problem of orderly disposal of these mineral resources
appears to have been first considered by the Continental
Congress in 1785, and at that time an "Ordinance For Ascertain-
ing the Mode of Disposing of Lands in the Western Territory"
was passed which provided for sale o£ the land with a res-
ervation of one third of all "gold, silver, copper, and lead
18
mined, to be sold, or otheirwise disposed of by Congress. . ..'.'
It does not appear that any lands were ever sold under author-
ity of this law and it lost its validity upon dissolution of
the Continental Congress.
After the American Revolution the vast territory of the
West was viewed as a possible source of funds for payment of
18. Ordinance of May 20, 1785, 28 J. Cont. Cong. 375
-6-

the war debts, and various plans for sale of the lands.
Including the mineral resources therein, were proposed.
Each plan met with disappointing results and by 1830
Congress had virtually abandoned any thought of raising
revenue by sale of the lands and adopted a policy of
19
encouraging settlement thereon. During this period,
however, some copper lands were disposed of in the Great
Lakes Region, and for a short period after discovery of
lead in Missouri in 1807, a leasing program was substituted
for outright sale. ^^ The leasing program was a failure
because the cost of its administration amounted to more than
the royalty collected by the government. In 1829 Congress
returned to the policy of sale to the highest bidder and
21
authorized the sale of lands leased for mineral development.
Between 1829 and 1866 the idea of extracting royalties
from miners was dying a slow death and was finally abandoned
22
with enactment of the Mining Law of 1866. By the provisions
of this Act the public lands were thrown open to mineral
exploration and development. The locator was given some
assurance of legal protection for his claim, and it was
possible to acquire title to the land in fee simple by
"occupying and improving" the premises and expending not
19. American Law of Mining, Vol. 1, p. 8 i 1.4 (1960)
.
20. Act of March 3, 1829, 4 Stat. 364
21, Op. cit. supra note 19 at 9
22, Act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat 251, Rev. Stat. 2319,
30 U.S.C. § 22 (1958)
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less than one thousand dollars in labor and Improvements. ^^
This has remained the basic policy except for lands con-
sidered prospectively valuable for "coal, phosphate,
sodium, potassium, oil, oil shale, gas, sulphur and potash,"
which are subject to disposal by lease pursuant to the ^
provisions of the Leasing Act or the Mineral Leasing
Act for Acquired Lands, ^^ depending upon their classifi-
cation.
Oil and gas were not specifically covered by either
26 27
the 1866 Act, the Placer Mining Law . or the Mineral
28
Location Law of 1872, and there was considerable uncer-
tainty as to whether oil land was locatable under the
placer law. Although the first patent on oil land was
29
apparently issued in the Los Angeles area in 1880,
as late as 1883 the Secretary of the Interior considered
30its application to oil lands to be questionable. He didj
however, rule in favor of patenting these lands under the
placer law in 1883 and again in 1897, overruling a decision
to the contrary by local land officials against the Union
23. Ibid
24. 30 U.S.C. i 181 (1958)
25. Act of August 7, 1947, 61 Stat. 913, 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-359
(1958) . (hereinafter called the Acquired Lands Act)
26. See note 22 supra
27. Act of July 9, 1870, 16 Stat. 217, 30 U.S.C. i 52 (1958)
28. In 1872 the Acts of 1866 and 1870 were republished as a
single statute called the Mineral Location Law. 17
Stat. 91, 30 U.S.C. § 21 (1958)




31Oil Company. *** The initial decision against application
of the placer law was enough to cause the oil operators of
the West to seek Congressional relief from the fluctuating
decisions of the Land Department. ^ Their efforts were
successful, and by the Act of February 11, 1897, ^^ it \^as
\
specifically provided that ". . .lands containing petroleum
or other mineral oils, and chiefly valuable therefor, , . ,"
might be entered and patented under provisions of the law \
relating to placer mineral claims.
Under the placer law, the prospector went upon the
premises, conducted his explorations, satisfied himself that
the lands were valuable for oil and/or gas by discovery, and
thereafter made his claim to the location. Placer claims
located by a single individual based upon a single discovery
were limited to twenty acres, although an association of,
individuals could locate up to one hundred sixty acres so
long as no person held more than twenty acres. A discovery
was required within the limits of the claim before the entry
could proceed to patent and pass the fee. Generally, the
requirements of the statute were satisfied if the discovery
was considered sufficiently promising to justify expenditure
31. Union Oil Company, 23 L.D. 222 (1896), overruled by
Union Oil Company, 25 L.D. 351 (1897). See also Union
Oil Company v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 345 (1918)
32. The name of the Land Department was changed to Bureau of
Land Management by Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, Part
IV, § 403, 5 U.S.C. i 133y (1958)
33. Act of February 11, 1897, 29 Stat. 526
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of money, labor and materials by a reasonably prudent
operator in development of the property and extraction of
the minerals. After discovery the prospector could apply
to the proper land office for a patent and, upon its issuance,
35
receive title to the lands in fee simple.
The problems flowing from this policy were numerous,
and proved the placer law to be Inadequate so far as oil and/or
gas locations were concerned. The first objection was that
the fee title carried the entire estate out of the United
States and prevented the government from receiving any
future Income from production of the minerals, and this
attitude seemed to persist in spite of the failure of prior
36
programs. Also, the burden of making a discovery was a
difficult one for the prospector due to the enormous expendi-
ture of money involved and the great depth of drilling required.
The courts held that the location was not perfected until actual
37discovery was made and this put the oil prospector at some-
what of a disadvantage in protecting his claim while working
toward a discovery.
To clearly understand the problem, it must be remembered
that at the turn of the century a prospector was limited to
34, Chrisman V. Miller, 197 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1905);
Cascaden v. Bartolis, 162 F. 267(9th Cir. 1908);
Garibaldi v. Grille, 17 Cal. App. 540, 120 Pac. 425 (1912)
35, 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1958)
36, Op. cit. supra note 19 at 9
37, Chrisman v. Miller, 140 Cal, 440, 73 Pac. 1083, aff 'd. .
197 U,S, 313 (1905); Olive Land & Development Co. v.
Olmstead, 103 Fed. 568 (S.D. Cal. 1900); Nevada Sierra
Oil Co. V, Home Oil Co., 98 Fed. 673 (1889)
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twenty acres in each claim made, and in order to obtain the maximum
statutory amount it was necessary for him to associate with seven other
individuals, establish the claim, and then obtain a conveyance to him o£
the associates' interests. This restriction did not preclude the purchase
and subsequent patenting of additional claims, nor did it preclude the
making of additional claims by the prospector himself or in association
with others
. But if the prospector desired to obtain such additional
claims and block out an area for oil and gas development, he was faced
with the problem of working toward a discovery on all claims simultaneously
in order to protect them from settlement by someone else. ^®
39When Congress passed the Five Claims Act of 1903, it was in-
terpreted to mean that development on any one of five tracts, so long
as they were contiguous, would fulfill the statutory requirements as
to the other four. It became the practice to acquire five claims in
an area, lying contiguous to each other, overlying the same geological
structure. Since the claims would almost invariably contain the max-
imum allowable acreage, their .acquisition would allow the operator
to block out a total of 800 acres for development purposes.
38. Union Oil Company v. Smith, 166 Call. 217, 135 Pac. 966, affjd.,
249 U.S. 337 (1919)
39, The Act of February 12, 1903, 32 Stat. 825, provided ". . .
that where oil lands are located ... as placer mining claims,
the annual assessment labor upon such claims may be done upon
any one of a group of claims lying contiguous and owned by the
same person or corporation, not exceeding five claims in all
... (if) said labor will tend to the development or to deter-
mine the oil bearing character of such contiguous claims. "
-11-

Drilling operations would be confined to the tract considered
to be the most favorably located geologically, and if production
was obtained the operator would use that fact as a basis for
claiming the proof of the oil bearing character of the tract
drilled also proved the oil bearing character of the contiguous
tracts on the same structure, and met the statutory requirement
of discovery thereon. Moreover, it was thought that the Act
abolished the requirement of continuous occupancy of each
claim while working toward a discovery on a contiguous tract
which was claimed by the same person or corporation.
The decision in Union Oil Company v. Smith ^" was a
severe blow to that interpre^tation of the statute. In that
case Union Oil Company acquired five claims in California,
one of which had been made in 1883 by Richard Gird and seven
associates. After the claim was made the associates conveyed
their interest to Gird, and by mesne conveyances it was even-
tually acquired by Union Oil Company. This claim, known as
the "R.awley" claim, was unoccupied, and Union Oil made no
effort to occupy it. No discovery had ever been made on the
claim nor had any effort ever been made to explore for oil or
gas. Immediately adjoining the south half of the Rawley claim
was the "Sampson" claim, consisting of 160 acres, also owned
by Union Oil Company.
40* See note 38 supra
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Union entered upon the Sampson claim and began drilling
o]>erations, expending several thousand dollars in the process.
While these drilling operations were in progress. Smith enter-
ed upon the Rawley claim, re-marked the boundary, re-named it
the "Schley" claim and shortly thereafter began drilling opera-
tions thereon. Some forty-eight days later he filed a quiet
title action against Union Oil Company. Union defended on
the ground that the lands were situated on the same geologic
structure, and that: under the Five Claims Act , supra, it could
hold all five claims so long as drilling operations were being
diligently pursued on a contiguous tract.
The court didn't agree... It held that the statute spoke
of "annual assessment for labor" upon the tracts claimed, and
that this had always referred to labor performed after dis-
41
covery. Since there had been no discovery on the Rawley
claim, the court said Union could not hold it by a discovery
on the Sampson claim, even if drilling operations then in pro-
.
gress were successful. ^ It was also held that occupancy of
the Sampson claim w>uld not satisfy the occupancy requirement
as to the other claims, and Smith thus had a perfect right to
enter and begin operations.
Despite these problems, however, the oil lands of the West
passed rapidly into the hands of private owners. In 1909 the
Director of Geological Survey advised the Secretary of the
Interior that lands prospectively valuable for oil and gas




were leaving the public domain so fast that the ". . .govern-
ment will be obliged to repurchase the oil that it has
practically given away. , . ."^^ President Taft, taking a
cue from President Roosevelt's action in withdrawing huge
44portions of land for forest reserves, ' withdrew all public
lands from location and settlement which were considered
45
valuable for their oil and gas deposits. There was no
statutory authorization for this withdrawal and even Taft
himself must h&ve had some qualms as to the Constitutionality
of his action, because he implored Congress in 1910 to affirm
his withdrawal and authorize the Secretary of Interior to make
46future withdrawals to meet emergencies "of this type."
From 1910 to passage of the Leasing Act no program
existed for orderly exploration and development of mineral
resources on the public lands. During this period the Congress
wrestled with the issue of disposal of these mineral resources.
Some members favored outright transfer to the states; others
advocated a system of government supeirvised exploration and
43. United States v. Midwest Oil Company, 236 U.S.459,
466-467(1915)
44. See Forest Reserve Act, 26 Stat. 1103 (1891), 16 U.S.C.
i 471 (1958)
45. The withdrawals covered an estimated 3,041,000 acres of
"proven oil lands" in California and Wyoming. See 236
U.S. at 467
46. 45 Cong. Rec, 621-622(1910). The power was given the
President to withdraw lands "temporarily" by the Pickett
Act, 36 Stat. 847 (1910), 43 U.S.C.A. gl 141-143. The
Secretary of the Interior now holds the power to withdraw
lands under authority of Executive Order No. 10355 (1952),
17 Fed. Reg. 4831. See also 57 I.D. 331,332 (1941)
47. 30 U.S.C. gg 181-287 (1958)
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development, but even within this faction there seemed to be
no firm agreement as to whether it should be accomplished
under a leasing system, a sale, or a combination of the two.
And all the while the conservationists were arguing that
overproduction made any program of immediate development un-
48
necessary.
World War I, perhaps more than any other factor, brought
home the realization that orderly development of mi.neral
resources on the public lands was not only desirable but
necessary. Prior to the war nearly all the potash used in
the manufacture of explosives was imported from Germany ,^^
and with the war this supply was cut off. In 1917 an act
was passed providing for leasing of public lands for the pur-
50pose of mining this mineral. Moreover, it was the first
war in history which required petroleum products in quantity
for its successful prosecution and laid bare the fact that
any future conflJ.ct would undoubtedly place demands on the
petroleum industry which would dwarf those of the past. The
population was growing and would soon demand more petroletim
products for civilian consiHnption, The country was reportedly
short five million barrels of crude oil on June 1, 1919,
This shortage appeared astronomical at the time but today seems
48, Op. cit. supra note 19 at 84
49, Op, clt, supra note 19 at 58
50, Act of October 2, 1917, 40 Stat. 297, repealed by Act
of Feb, 7, 1927, c. 66, § 6, 44 Stat. 1057
51, 58 Cong. Rec, 4161 (1920)
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relatively insignificant. In 1945, at the end of World War
II, annual petroleum production amounted to 1,711,103,000
52barrels. At the time there was no real knowledge of con-
servation technique through scientific development or opera-
tion, and no indication of the large deposits shortly to be
53
discovered. All these factors combined presented the
possibility of exhaustion of known producing areas, and the
only solution then foreseen was to stimulate the search for,
54
and development of, new fields. It was against this back-
ground that the various political factions compromised their
55disagreements and passed the Leasing Act which, with its
amendments, governs disposal of mineral resources on the public
lands today.
II
THE NEW DISPOSAL SYSTEM
The Leasing Act changed the system of disposal from one
of complete alienation of the fee by patent to a leasing system
under which only a mineral leasehold passed to the lessee.
There was reserved to the United States a royalty payment
52. Statistical Abstract of the United States, p. 734, Table
822 (1947) . The production for Texas alone was reported
at 2,642,650 barrels daily for the week ending December 22,
1961. The Dallas Morning News, December 29, 1961, Sec.l,
p. 9, col. 2
53. Conservation of Oil and Gas, A Legal History, 623 (Mxjrphy
ed. 1948) Mineral Law Section, American Bar Association
54. Ibid
55. 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181—287 (1958)
56. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F. 2d 649
10th Cir. 1960); West v. Work, 11 Fed. 828 (D.C. Cir 1926),
cert, denied . 271 U.S. 689 (1926)
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from production and a specified rental payment. The Secretary
of the Interior was delegated the right to issue prospecting
permits which for a period of two years allowed the permittee
to enter upon the lands embraced in the permit for the purpose
of prospecting for oil and gas. If he made a discovery in pay-
iny quantities, he was entitled to a lease, called an "A"
lease, covering one-fourth of the lands embraced in the permit,
or one hundred sixty acres, whichever was less, at a royalty
57
rate of five per cent. The permittee had the right to select
these lands and usually selected those surrounding the dis-
covery well. He also had a preference right to a lease cover-
ing three- fourths of the lands remaining in the area included
in the permit, called a "B" lease, upon which he paid the
United States a royalty from production of not less than 12%
CO
per cent."^" The Secretary had the right to take the royalty
in kind and also the right to provide the maximum royalty,
depending upon production, not to exceed 32 per cent.^^
These leases were issued for a primary teirm of twenty years
"with the right of renewal for successive periods of ten years
each, under such terms and conditions as the Secretary pres-
cribed."^^
Section 17 of the Leasing Act"^ provided for disposal of
lands situated within the known geologic structure of a




61. 41 Stat. 443, as amended, 30 U.S.C. i 226 (1958)
-17-

producing oil or gas field on a competitive basis to the
"hlgihest responsible qualified bidder" in blocks not exceeding
six hundred forty acres, and conditioned upon the payment in
advance of an annual rental of one dollar pex acre and such
bonus as might be acceptable to the Secretary. The minimum
royalty rate was established at 12% per cent, although a
higher rate could be set and bids called for on that basis.
These leases were also issued for a term of twenty years, with
the right in the lessee to renew for successive periods of ten
years upon such "reasonable terms and conditions as
. • . pre-
scribed by the Secretary of the Interior
. ,
,,"
The practice of granting prospecting permits was abolished
in 1935 and provision was made for the Issuance of a lease called
a "noncompetitive lease" on lands not known to be within the \
63geologic structure of a producing oil or gas field. This
lease was Issued for a primary term of fi.ve years "and so long
thereafter as oil or gas (was) produced in paying quantities
• • . •
" The Act also provided that the "... person first
making application for the lease of any lands not within any
known geologic structure of a producing oil or gas field who
is qualified to hold a lease under this Act, ... shall be
entitled to a preference right over other's to a lease of such
65
lands without competitive bidding . . .." "^ Tlie royalty rate
62. Ibid
63. Act of August 21, 1935, 49 Stat. 674, 30 U.S.C. § 221 (1958)
64. Op clt. supra note 57 at 3. The primary term of the non-
conq>etitlve lease is now ten years. 30 U.S.C.A. § 226 (e) •
65. 30 U.S.C. § 226 (1958)
-18-

was changed to a flat 12-^ per cent on all production from
these leases to bring them in line with prevailing rates in
private leasing arrangements by another amendment in 1946.
Ill
THE ACQUIRED LANDS ACT
Since the Leasing Act^^ provided for leasing of lands
In the public domain only, it was not applicable to mineral
interests coming into the hands of the governmsnt by deed,
cession or condemnation. This situation was changed by the
68
Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands
. which provided that
these lands might be leased under the same terms and conditions
69
as lands in the public domain. Generally speaking, unless
the supervising agency indicates current or future use of the
lands is incompatible with development of its oil and gas reserves,
the lands are available for leasing.
This Act contains several exceptions which should be men-
tioned. Lands acquired which are situated within villages,
towns or incorporated cities, lands within or acquired for national
parks or monuments, or for military or naval purposes are not
included within its coverage. Also excluded are submerged
lands, lands acquired for mineral development by the government
66. Act of August 8, 1946, c. 916, § 12, 60 Stat. 957, 30 D.S.C. § 226(1958)
67. 30 U.S.C. g§ 181—287 (1958)
68. 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-359 (1958)
69. 30 U.S.C. i 352 (1958)
70. See note 68 supra
71* Submerged lands are leasable under the Submerged Lands Act
of 1953, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1958)
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and lands declared surplus by the government. It does not
authorize leasing except for those minerals covered in the
Leasing Act
.
Neither the Leasing Act nor the Acquired Lands Act govern
leasing of Indian Lands. These lands are leasable under entirely
different provisions of law, rules and regulations, and the
Tribal Council is given certain rights over the disposal pro-
73
,,
cedure. Also, neither of the Acts govern leasing of the
Naval Petroleum Reserves.
IV
THE LAND PATENT CASES
At the outset of the inquiry into the power of the Sec-
retary of the Interior to cancel -federal oil and gas leases
by administrative proceedings, we are met with the language
of the courts in the cases of Seaton v. The Texas Company
76
and Pan American Petroleum Corp, v. Pierson which equate
the issuance of an oil and gas lease by the Secretary to
the issuance of a land patent. In the former case it was
72. See note 67 supra .
73. 25 U.S.C, g§ 391—415 (1958)
74. The Naval Petroleum Reserves are under the exclusive jur-
isdiction of the Secretary of the Wavy subject to super-
visory control by Congress. Act of August 10, 1956, c.
1041, 70A Stat. 457, 10 U.S.C. S 7421 (1958)
75. 256 F. 2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
76. 284 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1960)
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clearly stated that if the cancellation was not permissible
under the principles o£ the land patent cases it should be
77
set aside. In deciding in the Pan American case that the
Secretary was without power to cancel, by administrative
proceedings, an outstanding oil and gas lease allegedly
procured through fraud, the Court stated that:
"It is not necessary to explore the extent of
the powers of the Secretary over the public
lands. Suffice it to say that prior to the
establishment of the lease system for mineral
lands, those lands ^ like other public lands
.
were sublect to disposition by patent and
,
upon issuance of the patent, administrative
control ceased and the patent could be set
aside or cancelled only by judicial proceed-
ings in the courts
.
• , , ,
"•
. .
(T)he government, by issuance of the
lease, has performed the last act required of
it to vest in the lessee the right to explore
for, produce, market and sell the oil and gas
underlying the leased premises. Similarly,
the issuance of a patent is the last act of
the government in disposing of the non-mineral
lands of the public domain. Upon performance
of this last act, administrative power to
annul or cancel ends and judicial pox^er begins," ^
(Emphasis supplied)
The Texas Company case actually was decided on the lesser
ground that the Secretary had exceeded his administrative
authority; the Pan American case was decided on the i^sue
of fraud in procurement, but the language employ&d by these
Courts indicates the determination of the legality of the
Secretary's action in cancelling outstanding federal oil
and gas leases is to be measxired by the principles of law
77, 256 F,2d at 721
78. 284 F,2d at 654
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developed under the land patent decisions.
The land patent has been defined as "a muniment o£ title
issued by a government or state for the conveyance of some
79
portion of the public domain," Although one might establish
an equitable title to lands in the public domain through com-
pliance with various provisions of lav, the legal title remains
80in the government until passed by patent. Congress, in the
81
exercise of its Constitutional power, has exclusive, plenary
and unlimited power to determine the times, conditions and
82
modes of transferring the public lands. The power extends
to the prescription of conditions upon its acquisition, and
allows Congress to exercise the same powers over, and dealings
with, the public lands as a private individual over lands owned
83
by him. The power therefore allows Congress to prescribe by
statute what portions of the public lands may be disposed of,
the manner in which it shall be done, and what interests may
be granted or reserved. Congress also has the power to pres-
cribe the requirements each individual must fulfill in order
to receive title to the lands. Thus the entryman, upon
satisfaction of certain statutory requirements laid dovra by
79. Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636 (1881); Black's Law
Dictionary, 4th ed 1282
80. United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S.
321(1906)
81. U.S. Const, art 4 i 3
82. Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92(1871); United States v.
Gratiot, 13 U.S. 644(1840)
83. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929)
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Congress, becomes entitled to the fee single title which is
84thereafter transferred to him in the farm of a land patent.
The duty of administering the statutes governing disposal
of the public lands and their mineral resources is vested in
85
the Secretary of the Interior, and it becomes his responsi-
bility, or that of his delegatee, to determine the availability
of the lands for disposal, the qualifications of individual
claimants, and to decide, in contested cases, which claimant
has the better right to the patent. When such determination
has been made, it is his further duty to perform the act of
issuing the patent* If he should refuse to do so, mandamus
will lie to force him to deliver it tp the person entitled
86
thereto.
Once the patent issues a presumption arises that the
act was done in full compliance with the law. That is to
say, the Secretary, in the performance of his duty under
the mandate of the statute, is presumed to have made all the
necessary determinations that the requirements of law have been
met prior to issuing the patent. This presvimption can be over-
come in a direct proceeding in equity to cancel, annul or set
aside the patent by a showing of want of jurisdiction in the
84. Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U.S. 367 (1921)
85. Rev. Stat. 441, 5 U.S.C, i 485 (1958), provides "The
Secretary of the Interior is charged with the supervision
of public business relating to . , . Public lands, includ-
ing mines." 30 U.S.C. i 189 (1958), provides that the
Secretary of the Interior shall have power "to prescribe
necessary and proper rules and regulations and do any
and all things necessary" to carry out the purposes of
the Act.




Secretary to dispose of the lands. In this case the patent
would be void, but the same limitation would apply in case the
patent was merely voidable. The same presuiiq>tion as to regu-
larity would arise and it would take a direct proceeding in
88
equity to cancel or annul the patent.
It can be seen from the foregoing discussion that the
power to weigh the facts and law in connection with the
issuance of the patent was expressly vested in the Secretary,
but once the instrument issued the power was cut off. He
89
could of course, as suggested by Judge Breitenstein,
initiate action through the Attorney General directly against
the holder of the instrument to cancel or annul it, but was
powerless to act directly against him through his own depart-
mental procedure.




one of the early land patent cases. In that case
Towsley entered upon a certain tract of land near Omaha,
Nebraska on June 15, 1858, niade improvements thereon, and
87. Lake Superior Ship Canal Ry. & Iron Co. v, Cunningham,
155 U.S. 354 (1894); Davis v. Wiebbold, 139 U.S. 507(1891);
Stoddard v. Chambers, 15 U.S. 119 (1844). Such a transfer
would be void for V7ant of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, A patent issued under a mistaken notion of the
law going to jurisdiction is void for want of authority,
since the action of a governmenc officer is valid only
if the act is within the scope of his lawful authority.
Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196 (1899); Sherman v.
Buick, 93 U.S. 209(1876); Leavenworth, L,& G. R.R. v.
United States, 92 U.S. 733 (1876)
88. United States v. Winona & St. Peter R.R., 67 F. 948
(8th Cir. 1895)
89. 284 F. 2d at 655
90. Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. 72 (1871)
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filed a declaration of intent to claim the land. He had pre-
viously set up a claim to other lands close by but withdrew
his claim thereto in favor of another sometime in June 1859,
waiving any further rights to that land. On October 5, 1860,
one Johnson also set up a claim to the lands claimed by Towsley,
built a small house thereon and enclosed it with a fence.
A controversy between the claimants resulted which was
investigated by the local land officers and a decision rendered
in favor of Towsley. The Commissioner of the General Land
Office affirmed the decision and a patent was issued to Towsley
on September 20,- 1862. The dispute was appealed to the
Secretary of the Interior who overruled the Commissioner on the
grounds that Towsley 's claim to the other lands disqualified
«
him as to his claim to the lands in dispute. A patent was
accordingly issued to Johnson and he entered upon the lands.
Towsley filed a quiet title action in the District Court
for Douglass County, Nebraska, which ordered Johnson to convey
the land to Towsley. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed
91
the decision and Johnson appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States. In affirming the judgment the Supreme
Court said:
"It is very well known that the officers (of
the Land Department) do not confine themselves
to determining, before a patent issues, who is
entitled to it, but they frequently assume the
right, long after the patent has issued and
the legal title passed out of the United States,
to recall or set aside the patent, and issue one
to some other party, and if the holder of the




"a second .... If the land officers cavi do
this a few weeks or a few months after the first
patent has issued, what limit is there to their
power over private rights?"^^
Which patent was treated as the valid instrument is rendered
uncertain because, while the subsequent patent was described
as a cloud on Towsley's title, the Nebraska District Court
ordered it conveyed to Towsley. The quoted language makes it
fairly plain, however, that the Supreme Court of the United
States considered the first patent valid to effect the transfer
of the land, thereby requiring the conclusion that the second
patent was void, and no more than a cloud on Towsley's title.
Just six years later, in Moore v« Robbins . the Court
crystallized its thinking concerning limitations on the Land
Department's power over patents after their issuance in the
following langiiage:
"While conceding for the present, to the fullest:
extent, that when there is a question of contest-
ed right betv/een private parties to receive from
the United States a patent for any part of the
public land, it belongs to the head of the Land
Department to decide that question, it is
equally clear that when the patent has been
awarded to one of the contestants, and has
been issued, delivered and accepted, all
right to control the title or to decide on
the right to the title has passed from the
land office. Not only has it passed from the
land office, but it has passed from the
Executive Department of the government ...
with the title passes away all authority or
control of the Executive Department over the
land, and over the title which it has conveyed.
If fraud, mistake, error, or x^rong; has been
done^ the courts of justice present the only
remedy . These court.5 are as open to the United
States to sue for cancellation of the deed or
reconveyance of the land as to individuals; and
if the government^ is the party injured, this is the
proper course." ^^ (Emphasis supplied)
92» 80 U.S. at 84 :
93. 96 U,S, 530,532 (1877)
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In United States v. Stone the Suprenie Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Grier, said:
"The patent is but evidence of a grant, and the
officer x?ho issues it acts ministerially and not
judicially. If he issues a patent for land
reserved from sale by law, such patent is void
for want of authority. But one officer of the
land office is not competent to cancel or annul
the act of his predecessor. That is a judicial
act, and requires the judgement of a court."
In deciding Smelting Co. v. Kemp the Court expanded upon
the language of Moore v. Robbins, supra, and clearly expressed
in rather strong terms the presumption of regularity and validity
attaching to the grant upon issuance of the patent. It said:
"A patent, in a court of law, is conclusive to all
matters properly determinable by the Land Depart-
ment, when its action is within the scope of its
authority, that is, when it had jurisdiction under
the law to convey the land. In that court the
patent is unassailable for mere errors of judg-
ment. Indeed, the doctrine as to the regularity
and validity of its acts ... goes so far
that if in any circumstances under existing
law a patent would be held valid, it will be
presumed that such circumstances existed." ^^
There are three possible situations suggested by these
cases. First, as In the Tows ley case, the patent is valid and
carries the title out of the United States. Second, as In-
the Stone case, the patent is void ab initio for want of
jurisdiction, either because its disposal was prohibited by
law or because the United States did not have title to the
land at the time of the attempted transfer. Third, as suggested
by Moore v. Robbins . we have the case in which the patent car-
ries the title out of the United States but for one reason or
another is voidable. Clearly, the Secretary is without power
94. 69 U, S. 525,535 (1865)
95, 104 U.S. 636,646(1881). See also Wltbeck v. Hardeman,
51 F.2d 450 (5th Clr. 1931). aff'd. . 286 U.S. 444(1932)

under the rules laid down In these cases to cancel or annul
the patent instrument by his own fiat, be it valid, voidable
or void. He must go into court in a direct proceeding in
equity to accomplish that result. So too must private parties
contesting their title claims in the event that the contest
takes the form of litigation between claimants in which the
Secretary is not involved,
A moment's reflection on the matter demonstrates the wis-
dom of the view, and the inapproprlateness of purported admin-
istrative cancellation of even void instruments. For example,
suppose that a certain section of land is not available for
disposal by the Bureau of Land Management, because of prior
reservation, appropriation to other uses by the government,
or because the government does not have title to the land, but
nevertheless a patent is issued purporting to transfer the
land. The instrument would not carry title out of the United
States into the purported patentee. The act is a mere null-
ity. But suppose the lands were thereafter made available
for disposal and were legally patented. Two patents are
now outstanding on the same land—one void ab initio and
the other valid. The Secretary now decides to cancel the
patent he considers void and does so administratively. If
the holder refuses to surrender it for cancellation—and
the Secretary has no power as has a court to compel its sur-
render--the attempted cancellation is without the desired
effect. The cloud upon the true patentee's title would remain,
-28-

It would still take the action of a court to clear the title
by adjudicating the clouding instrument void. This appears
to be the premise upon which Hr. Justice Grier postulated
his views in the Stone case, supra . This is not to suggest,
of course, that the Secretary cannot, in a clear case, treat
an obviously void patent as a nullity; only that he cannot
adjudicate its status in his own departmental determination.
Considerably different in possible consequences is the
situation wherein the patent is voidable instead of void.
This was the problem in United States v, Winona & St. Peter
96
R, R. There certain lands were certified to the State of
Minnesota for the purpose of aiding in the construction of
railroads. The railroads were to receive alternate sections
of land along the line when it became definitely fixed.
When the map thereof was filed with the proper authorities,
the rights of the railroad attached to those sections. Lands
to which preemption or homestead rights had already attached
were excluded from the grant, and in lieu thereof the rail-
roads were permitted to claim other lands up to a specified
distance from the line, as it appeared on the plat, from
97
available public domain lands contained therein.^' Certain
preemption filings and homestead entry rights had attached
prior to final location of the line by Winona, The Secretary
of the Interior proceeded to cancel these filings and entries
96. 67 F, 948 (8th Cir. 1895)
97. 67 F, at 949
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by Departmental action and the railroad ultimately received
title to the lands.
Some thirteen to eighteen years later the United States
discovered its error in cancelling these filings and entries
and brought suit to set aside the conveyance to the railroad.
During the intervening years the railroad had conveyed title
to various purchasers \iho bought the land without knowledge
that the Land Department was in error in making the cancella-
tions. The Court refused to set aside the conveyance.
The reasoning behind the decision was that the Land
Department had jurisdiction over the lands, since patents had
not gone out to the preemptors and homesteaders at the time
of certification of the lands to the State. The. filings and
entries did not operate to take the legal title out of
the government. And even though the statute excluded them,
their rights were cut off by the erroneous action of the
Land Department in passing the lands to the State for the
railroad. Moreover, even though the grant might have once
been subject to attack, the rights of bona fide purchasers
had intervened and this in and of itself was a complete bar
to the government's suit.
Carrying the analysis a step further, in the case of
voidable patents, neither party is left without a remedy. If
the patent should have gone to applicant A because of prior
right but instead was issued to applicant B, a court of equity




conq>el B to convey the property to him. The rule was clear-
ly expressed in Johnson v. Towsley ;
"And • . .if . . • the legal title has passed
from the United States to one party, when, in
equity and good conscience, and by the laws
which Congress has made on the subject, it
ought to go to another, a court of equity
will , , , convert him into a trustee of the
true owner, and compel him to convey the
legal title." ^9
Moreover, even though the grant was initially voidable, a
court can weigh the equities which since may have attached,
such as costly improvements installed by B, and refuse to
impress the trust, or, in a direct proceeding by the Secretary,
refuse to decree a cancellation of the voidable patent, the
while framing its decree as necessary to compel B to do
\^at an equitable disposition requires. Certainly the
Secretary is without the power of a court of equity to do
such a thing, and moreover is at least a potential litigant
in such situations which is further reason for barring him from
performing any such function by administrative procedures*
Once this is realized, the reason for the courts' insistence
upon judicial proceedings when a patent has issued can
scarcely be denied, for in no other way can there be the
degree of certainty of title which is essential to property
ownership and property transactions.
98. Cohen v. Fall, 284 F. 734 (1922); Hodge v. HcCall, 185
Cal. 330, 197 Pac. 86 (1921); Bond v. Walters, 38 Cal.
App. 245, 175 Pac. 909 (1918)




A consideration and analysis o£ the land patent cases
provides us with a set of principles from vjhich we can proceed
to fashion a test for determining the limitations upon the
action of the Bureau of Land Management in connection with
an outstanding patent. The first consideration Is whether
or not the Bureau had jurisdiction over the lands. If It
didn't, then there was no power of disposition and the act
was void, though not subject to adjudication as such by
the Secretary's departmental procedures. Second, If it did
have jurisdiction then the power was also present to deter-
mine the claims of applicants and, upon reaching such a
determination, to perform the final act of issuing the
patent. Whether the action was ^ight or wrong is of no
moment, the act carried the title out of the United States
In considering the land patent cases it must be kept In
mind that we are dealing with the passage of a fee title,
sometimes with the mineral interests reserved to the United
states m the in,tr.«.ent Itself, as -in the railroad grauts/""
rather than a lease conveying all or part of the mineral interest
out of the government. The matter becomes important as the
Secretary contends that the retention of legal title to the fee
removes the mineral leases from the rules applicable to the
land patent cases, a contention which is later considered.
100, For example, see Act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat, 489,
amended by the Acts of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 356, and
the Act of July 3, 1866, 14 Stat, 79, granting certain
lands to the Union Pacific R. R. and its branches. See
also United States v. Northern Pacific R.R. , 176 F, 706,




The cases previously discussed are by no means all of
the land patent decisions vhich deal with the Issue of govern-
mental power to annul or cancel the patent after issuance by
administrative action, but they are the leading cases. It
appears quite obvious from the language of those opinions
that the courts considered the administrative power at an
end upon issuance of the patent. As Judge Brietenstein put it:
"Upon performance of this act, admin-
istrative power to annul or cancel ends
and judicial power begins." *^^
V
THE FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASE
Ignoring for the purposes of this inquiry the restric-
tions conservation authorities may place upon production and
sale of the oil and gas that may be taken from a particular
tract of land, the owner thereof has the unlimited right to
produce and dispose of oil and gas taken from wells located
on his property. And with this right to dispose of these
products exists the correspondent right to prevent others
from utilizing his property for the purposes of prospecting
for or producing them.
Today, few landowners attempt to produce the oil and
gas underlying their lands themiselves. Instead, the right
to develop the property is usually granted to another, with
the landowner reserving unto himself a share of the production
free of cost, called a "royalty," through the use of an instrument
101. 284 F. 2d at 654
-33-

known as an "oil and gas lease," By the terms of this,
instrument the landowner grants to the lessee the exclusive
right to go upon the property for the purpose of exploring for
oil and gas, producing these minerals if found, and to dis-
pose of them. Under the terms of the typical lease, the land-
owner now has a royalty interest and the lessee has what is
known as a working interest in the minerals. The term of
this agreement is usually for a stated term of years,
called a primary term, and so long thereafter as oil and/or
J J . . . . 102gas are produced xn paying quantities.
The relationship here is not the same as that of landlord
and tenant under a common law lease of land. In Louisiana,
because of that state's civil heritage, an oil and gas lease is
deemed to be in the same category as an agricultural lease, but
103by statute is declared to be an interest in the land itself.
Though there may be considerable diversity of opinion as to whether
the lease is real or personal property, it is elsetjjhere generally
agreed that the lease does create an interest in the land itself,
102, The term "'paying quantities' requires a comparison of
net revenues from the lease as it was originally executed
without exclusion of overriding royalties and production
payments created therefrooi. Costs of a capital nature,
such as exploration, drilling, and equipment, are not
considered. Thus, the test involves matching current
expenses (exclusive of depreciation, depletion, and
amortization) against current revenues," Galvin,
Developing An Oil and Gas vJurisprudence In Michigan,
7 Wayne L. Rev, 426 (1961) (Citations Omitted)
103, Lilly v. Conservation Cotru-nissioner, 29 F. Supp. 892
(E.D, La, 1939); Frost-Johnson Lumber Co, v. Sailing's
Heirs, 150 La, 756, 91 So. 207(1920). See Nabors, The
Louisian Mineral Servitude and Royalty Doctrines: A Report
to the Mineral Law Committee of the Louisian State Law
Institute, 25 Tul, L, Rev, 30 (1951), 26 Tul L, Rev, 23
(1952). See Acts 1956 § 432, LARS 9:1105.
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Typically, the governmeait in the role of landovmer leases
its lands for development of oil and gas resources in a leas-
ing transaction of tisual form, retaining a royalty payable from
104production, with the working interest passing to the leasee
upon execution of the lease. It is the practice of seeking
to extinguish this latter interest by administrative action
with which we are here concerned,
A conqparison of the language in the granting clause of
the federal oil and gas lease with that of the typlcc:! form
lease used in private transactions shows no basis for sub-
stantial difference in the nature of the interest granted.
The federal lease provides:
"Section 1, Rights of the lessee , — The lessee
is granted the ei'Cclusive ri^ht and privilege to
dril.l for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of
all the oil and gas deposits, except heliiim gas,
in the lands leased, together with the right to
construct -and toaintain thereupon, all works,
lines, reservoirs, tanks, pumping stations, or





The typical "Producers 88" form lease provides:
", ,., the lessor, • . ^oes >:,rarit, deroiss, lease
and let exclusively unto said lessee, T-yith the
exclusive right of mining, exploring by geophysical
and other methods and operating for and producing
therefrom oil and all gas of ^.Thatsoever nature
or kind, and laying pipe lines, telephone and
telegraph lines, housing and boarding employees,
building tanks, power stations, gasoline plants,
ponds, roadways, and structures thereon to pro-
duce, save, market and take cere of said products
104, The Government leasing form is set ^.-rth in full in
Appendix II, See also Malone, Oil and Gas Leases on
United States Government Lands, 2d Ann, Inst, on Oil





and the exclusive surface and sub-surface rights
and privileges related in any manner to any and
all such operations and any and all other rights
and privileges necessary, incident to, or conven-
:". ient for the economical operation, • • ." ^^°
In both cases the lessee is granted the exclusive right to go
upon the land, drill for and produce the oil and gas underlying
the land and dispose of the products by sale or otherwise. He
is granted the right in addition to do any and all things necessary
to accomplish the purposes of the lease, and so jcuch of the surface
of the land as is required for the enjoyment of his estate may
be occupied to the exclusion of the surface owner.
Exactly what legal interest the lessee has acquired
under the lease has been considered by many courts and has
107produced considerable discussion by various authors. In
Texas the landowner is considered to have title to the tainerals
in place beneath his land, and by a grant of either the surface
or the minerals, with a reservation of the other, a horizontal
severance of the property is effected and two separate and
distinct estates are created. These two estates are cora^id-
ered to be as distinct from each other as if the severance
108
had been vertical rather than horizontal.
106. The "Producers 88" form lease is set forth in full in
Appendix III,
107. 1 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law 32-45(1959);
Walker, Fee Sitn^le Ocraership of Oil and Gas in Texas
6 Tex, L. Rev. 125(1928); Walker, Nature of Interests
created by an Oil and Gas Lci:se, 7 Te:<,L, Rev. 1(1928)
;
Galvin, op, cit, supra note 102 at 405,
108. Stephens v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co,, 113 Tex. 160,
254 S.W, 290(1923); Humphreys-Mexia Co, v, Gam^r^a,
113 Tex, 247, 254 S.W, 296, 302(1923). See al^o
Walker, op, cit. supra note 107,
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In other states the theory of owaership of the minerals
in place has been denied on the grounds that oil and gas
are fugacious in nature and hence incapable of ownership
until reduced to possession. It is impossible under this
view to create a corporeal estate in the minerals, and hence
a lease can create no more than an incorporeal interest
which is generally described in the non-ovmership sir;tes as
a protit a prendre.
109, 1 Williams & Meyers, op. eit. sirprn note 107 « A survey
of the decisions o;£ the courts in the non-ocTTiership
jurisdictions which have considered the point reveals
a remarkable diversity of analyois as to waccher £.ii oil
and gas lease is real or personal property. In Contin- ''
cntsl Supply Co. v. Marshall, 152. F, 2d 300 (10th Cir.
1945) , for example, an oil and gas lease is slio".m to be
personal property for some classifications and real pro-
perty for others. Regcardless of this diversity, however,
there is general agreement that the lease does create an
interest in land.
The basic rationale underlying the problem of classi-
fication und6r the theories of owr^erchip secais to be
the opinion that the migratory nature of th^a subst.-sncfc of
oil and gas renders the subject cjatter incap':bls of o"yn-
ership until reduced to possession on the one hand, ,v^nd
the opposing view that the landowner OT-ms the minerals in
place beneath his l£;nd. In the early cases the lando',ri3.ar ' s
interest was considered coutparable to that in wild anlc^als
upon his land and thus not his until possessed. Thic an-
alogy seems to be erroneous, since the lando'imer has no
property interest in the wild anitrials on his land and could
be denied the privilege of hunting any or all of thea. But
he caraiot be denied the right to take the oil and gas from
beneath his land, although the amount and irtrmner of taking
may be regulated (Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190
(1900), Nevertheless, such concepts have had considerable
impact upon the development of the law of oil and gas and
have been given vitality by the courts, principally because
the various legislatures have not seen fit to provide a def-
inition of the interest which follows a pattern of consist-
ency.
Some jurisdictions use the term "qualified oumcrship" in-
stead of "non-oxornership" in recognition of the correlative
rights of owners in the coiston source of supply. In legal
effect the qualified and non-ownership theories are said to
be "almost indistinguishable." Galvin, op^ cit. supra note
102, at 405, n. 10.
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No cases have been found in which the interests created
under the federal oil and gas lease have been defined, but the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Br itish-Arre rican
Oil Producing Company v. Board of Ecualization of the State
of Montana indicates a carved out mineral interest is a
distinct and separate estate in the minerals. That case cairte to
the Court from the Supreme Court of Montana^^ on the issue of
vhether or not the State of Montana could levy gross prorltzction
and net proceeds taxes on oil production from trust lands held
by the United States £a£ the benefit of the 3lackfeet Indians,
In disposing of the case the Court said:
"•
• • * reservation for the benefit of the tribe
of all minerals
.
Including; oil and .<r"i3 t in or
under the allotte<f land, operr^.tes to cri.rvs out
of such land and create a distiact estate eoroist-
ing of the minerals . Thig estate is in itself
land, ., , ."'•^^ (Eiatphasis supplied)
The language would seem to indicate that the Court was of the
opinion a separate corporeal estate dould be created in the
minerals in place by reservation. If this be so, then it v7ould
appear that an oil and gas lease on federal land might also
operate as a horizontal severance of the surface and mineral
interests and allow the erection of tv70 separate and distinct
113
estates under the same theory as employed by the Texas courts.
But even if the non-possessory analysis bo the foundation for
110. 299 U.S, 159 (1936)
111. 101 Mont. 293, 54 P. 2d 129(1935)
112. 299 U.S. at 164-165
113. See note 108 supra
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measuring the property transfer effects of the federal oil and
gas lease, all states not adhering to the Texas theory, including
Louisiana which is not a coitscon law state, acknowledge that
at least an Incorporeal interest in land, which is property,
has been conveyed.
Presumably, when the question must be faced, the
courts dealing with federal rights and obligations will be
guided by one of the two conaaon law concepts. If thi^t postulate
is valid, then there should be no difference in the property
relationship created by the federal oil and g£3 lease and the
lease comononly used by private citizens unless the statute
requires a different result. The rights granted to the
lessee are substantially the same and so are his obligations.
The royalty paid to the government may be said to be generally
the same as that commonly paid in comparable private leasing
arrangements. It does not appear the Leasing Act ^ would
in any way require a different relationship. The most re-
markable difference seems to be in the identity of the lessor.
Of course there may be differences in the prirrjary terms of
the leases, but this does not alter the relationship. Both
provide for a determinable fee, be it possessory or non-
possessory, consisting of a primary term of a specified
number of years and so long thereafter as oil and/or gas
115
are produced in paying quantities.
114. 30 U.S. C. §§ 181-287(1958)
115. See note 102 supra
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In its brief to the Tenth Circuit in Pan A^arican
Petroleum Corp, v« Pierson the government states:
"In simple words this concept of an oil and gas
lease makes it similar to a l^ase of land for
growing crops, where the rental in whole or in
part is a portion of the crops."116
And further that:
"An oil and gas lease is cotnaionly considered a
profit a prendre rather thrc, as an estate in
land."'^^^^7^
Here, the government relies upon the cases of Bttrnett v,
118 119
Earsael and Group No. 1 Oil Co. v> Eo. s.s. from which the
foregoing language is' quoted, in support of this proposition.
Both of these cases involved tax questions and are thariifora
poor authority for support of any concept of interests created
by an oil and gas lease except for the purpose of resolving
the tax question then before the court. The Burnett case in-
volved the question of whether or not bonus payments under an
oil and gas lease were tameable as capital gains; Gro-jp No. 1
Oil Co. V. Bass involved the question of whether or not income
received from production of oil and gas on state land, under
a lease from the State of Texas, was taxable to the Icsseci.
In the Burnett case the consrt did say:
"By virtue of the lease, the lessee acqaires the
privilege of exploiting tho: land for the production
of oil and gas for a prescribed period; he may
explore, drill, and produce oil and gas found.
116. Brief for Appellee, p. 35, Pan ^-laerican Petroleum
11 . Corp..v, Pifeffebii:;) 284 F.2d 649(10th Cir 1960)
117. Ibid . . ../ (i'^'-Vi)
118. 287 U.S. 103(1932)
5.19. 283 U.S. 279(1931)
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Such Q-perafcions with respect -to a nine have been
said to res£-.'n.ble a cnnufactoring b-'sineas carried
on by the use c£ the soil, » rather tban a sale
of the land or of any interest in it or in its
mineral content, " -^^^ (Eofphasis supplied)
All the court held in that case was that an oil and gas lease
could not be considered a sale of a capital asset, under the
terms of the tax statute, for capital gains purposes. It is
of course elementary that the courts ignore local property
concepts and construe tax statutes in a uniform manner consist-
ent with the scheme for collection of revenue in order that
the system may operate upon a uniform basis of applio^ilon.
A consideration of the above cases illustrates the ooir.t.
The government's contention that the lease should be
"considered a profit a prendrfe rather than an estate in land",
and therefore analogous to an agricultural lease, is difficult
to iinderstand, A profit a prendre is an int'^rfcr.t in l.-^.ad
which fails to be an estate only because it is non-possessory
(incorporeal) in nattare. It was so recognized at coacaon law,
and the weight of authority does not suggest that the interest
should be treated differently in connection with oil and gas
leases, the determinable fees of which in non-ox«iership states




The history of the Leasing Act seems to indicate that
the framers did not legislate in derogation of the comsion law
concept of the oil and gas lease and would allow it to be
120. 287 U,S, at 107
121. See note 114 supra
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cancelled only by judicial proceedings. In this connection
Senator Lenroot said:
"•
• . the Secretary of the Interior has no right
or authority under the bill to cancel a lease.
It can only be canceled by judicial procedure and
a forfeiture," ^^^
123Mr, Anderson further spoke of "interests held" under the
lease, and that the ", , , resources once passing out of the
hands of the United States under a lease granted under (the)
act are no longer subject to the legislative action of
Congress, "•'•^^ It seems clear it was expected that an interest
in the land itself would pass to the lessee upon issuance of
the lease.
Even assuming arguendo that under the federal oil and gas
lease the relationship of the parties is purely contractual,
without the passage of any interest in or to the land itself,
can the sovereign repudiate the contract? The case^; indicate
that it makes no difference in matters of contract that one
party is the sovereign and the other a private citizen. It
has long been held that when the United States enters into a
contract with one of its citizens, its rights and duties ^re
governed by the law applicable to contracts b^stween private '^
individuals. Valid contracts are property, and as such are
protected against governmental action seeking to take away
that property without compensation. Once the right vests, the
sovereign has no (right to Invalidate it unless its action
CO :: ' \. >':.[.' .
122. 58 Cong, Rec, 4169(1920)
123. Id at 7604




coioes within some provision of the Constitution allowing it.
The Supreme Court of the United States has observed that:
"If they (the United States) repudiate their
obligations, it is as much repudiation, with
all the wrong and reproach that term irrtplies,
as it would be if the repudiator had been a
State or a municipality or a citizen, , ,,
"(Congress) cannot undo what has already been
done, and it cc^nnot unmake contracts that hsrve
already been made, , ,,"^26
From what has been said, it seems reasonable to conclude
that a federal oil and gas lease does pass an intorect in land,
an interest that vests upon execution of the lec:se. If this
be so, there is no legal difference in status of the title to
an interest created by lease and that created by patent. In
both cases whatever rights the government had pass upon execu-
tion of the instrument creating the interest, and the fact that
the government retains the fee title to the surface estate,
which carries with it a possibility of reverter in the deter-
minable mineral fee granted, does not detract from the right
to protection of the granted interest.
Even if the relationship were purely contractual, it is
to be doubted that the government could unilaterally repudiate
the contract and destroy the ri^ts created thereby without
limitation, A private citizen could not do so and there is no
good reason why such a right should impliedly be granted to
the government. If a different relationship were considered
125, Lynch v. United States, 292 U,S. 571(1934); Calhoun v.
Massie, 253 U^S, 170 (1920); Hoke v. United States,
227 U,S, 308(1913); Chan^lon v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
126. Central Pacific R,R, v. Gallantin, 99 U.S, 700, 719-721(1879)
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desirable, there is no reason why it should not be provided
for by contract at the time the lands are leased. But Congress
has so far failed to provide authority for such a contractual
provision within its delegation of power to the Secretary, and
if it is to be found it toust be implied. As Judge Fahy so appro-
priately stated in Jhe Texas Corirpanv^^'^ case, "the relevant
considerations weigh against ittqplying the power,"
VI
THE SECRETARY'S STATUTORY PCWERS
Considerable power over the public lands has been
delegated to the Secretary of Interior, Under the I.e.?.sing
A-ct he is specifically authorized to issue such regulations
128
as necessary to effect the purposes of the Act, But his
powers here rise no higher than necessary to accoiaplish the
purposes of disposal envisioned by the statute. It is sig-
nificant to observe that the statute itself clearly liirdts
his power to cancel the lease once it is executed. The
difficulty here is that the Secretary apparently does not
consider himself bound by the provisions of the statute which
grant the power.
The reason for this position is iJX&iilBed upon a delegation
of responsibility in 5 U.S.C, i 485, which provides that the
Secretary is charged with:
127, See Appendix I




. , the suprevision of public business
relating to , , , public lands, including "
mines,"
It is apparent that the Secretary considers this provision of
law to grant him an almost limitless reservoir of power upon
which he can draw to cancel leases issued under the provisions
of the Leasing Act , whether or not the Act itself gives him
any such power.
Such a construction of the statute was uhkno^:'n to the
Sixty-Sixth Congress when the Leasing Act was being considered.
The history of the Act unequivocally shovys that the power to
cancel a lease was not only to be liunited, but denied alto-
gether except through judicial proceedings. In discussing
the matter Senator Lenroot said:
"I should like to remind both Senators (Smoot
and McKellar) that the Secrat-^/ry of the l^iterior
has no right cr authority u/ader the bill fco
cancel a lor.se. It cr.n only be canceled by __.
judicial proceedings and a forfeiture, , • ."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Congress ioiial Record further shows that Mr, Anderson
attempted to insert a provision for cancellation and forfeiture
without coxjort proceedings in cases of fraud:
"Mr, Anderson : Mr, Chairman, I move to strike out
the last word, I want to aak the Chairrtirin of the
Committee a question. The provision beginning on
line 6, page 6 provides:
'any interests held in violation of this
act shall be forfeited to the United States
by appropriate proceedings instituted by
the Attorney General' and so forth,
129. 58 Cong. Rec. 4169(1920)
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I take it that under that language the holding is
valid and any operations conducted under it would
be valid until after action brought by the United
States, Am I correct in my construction of the
language?
Mr, Sinnott : That would relate to a lease, but not
to a permit. The secretary has certain rights
under a perxait, but after the permit is tnarged into
a lease, then it will, take court action ,
Mr, Anderson ; Well, Mr, Chairman, I want to ask
vihat was. the reason for that sort of provision?
Ordinarily a legse t~ould be void ab initio., but
here you put the entire burden on the ^overmr.snt
to procesd to forfeit th/s loase before anything
can be done in the way o£ showing fraud ,
Mr, Sinnott: It is in recognition of that legal,
or equitable principle that the law abhors a for-
feiture, and there must be a shc'-ying; Tr>-r.de in court
bef<3re the forfeiture can be securc^d.
Mr. Sinnott : , • , it is in line vrlth all court
proceedings in relation to forfeiture, "*^^
(Emphasis supplied)
Mr, Anderson's motion was defeated, and the Act aa passed pro-
vided for cancellation of prospecting permits by the Secretary
for want of diligence on the part of the permittee in prosecu-
tion of prospecting operations in accordance with the terms
of the permit. No provision was made for cancellacion of leases
by the Secretary under any circumstances except through court
proceedings instituted by the Attorney General, Thus it can
be seen that at the time of passage of the Act the fravners
were purposely limiting the power of the Secretary to the area
of determination prior to issuance of the lease. It can pro-
perly be assumed that Mr, Sinnott considered the merger of
the permit into a lease to divest the Secretary of his poxier
130. Id at 7604
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over the leased premises. His control at that point would be
cut off, leaving any further proceedings affecting title to
the judiciary.
The Secretary^ counters xd.th the argument that under the
provisions of 5 U.S.C, i 485 he is charged with the "supervision"
over the public lands, and that under this broad grant ox power
he has the power to do all things connected with these lands,
including the cancelling of outstanding leases, at any time
unless a fee patent has passed. Ee further contends that this
131general power was not repealed or limited by the Leasing; Act ;
that its provisions do not require court proceedings, but
rather provide that court cancellation is only an alternative
remedy. In short, his position is that he may repair to the
132
courts or to himself for relief as he chooses.
In addition to the incredible concept that an administra-
tive officer shares judicial power with the courts—in fact
controls whether a matter shall be heard by a court or himself—
this contention must fail for another reason. Under the general
grant of supervisory power, it must be assumed tha Congress
intended the word "supervision" to convey its coauvonly accepted
meaning or it would have indicated otherx^lse, The-.word
"superviseV is said to mean "to oversee for direction; to
superintend; to inspect with authority" or to "exercise super-
133
vision over" a specific act or undertaking. The ward
'
.nipv;r\ i;;?.o;i ;'..; tiefiiieo no Lac act rv ijociipaticra
131, See note 114 supra
132, Brief for Appellee, pp, 15-28, Boesche's Administrator v, c
Udall, Civ, No. 16,238 (D.C. Cir., April 16, 1961)




"supervision" is defined as the "act or occupation of super-^
vising," Such a grant, without more, could scarcely include
power to destroy what Congress plainly intended to be vested
property rights.
To argue otherwise would be to say that the general grant
of power vested in the Secretary exclusive authority over the
public lands subject only to specific limitation by subsequent
legislation. Such a concept is foreign to our legislative
process and contrary to prior and subsequent Congressional
action concerning disposal of the public lands, Congir^ss has
many times expressed its desire that portions of ths public
lands be disposed of in various ways for various purposes,
and the language of those enactments leave no doubt but that
the responsibility delegated under 5 U,S,C, i 485 was intended
to do no more than fix responsibility in a Bep rt;.' leat of the
Executive Branch of the government for the -pur^^ose of carrying
out the legislative intent as to subsequent dispositions of
135
the public lands and general business matters relating thereto.
If such power may be found in this provision of law, it
is indeed strange that it escaped the attention of the Secretary
of Interior for approximately eighteen years. This is especially
significant when it is remambered the; i^ partment of Interior
took the position in 1930 that cancellation was irapossible
JO
except through judicial proceedings. But in 1938, in an
opinion by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, the position
was takenithat the Department could determine the validity of
134, Ibid
135, See note 100 supra
136, The Melish Consolidated Placer Oil Mining Co, v, Testerman,
53 I.D. 205 (1930)
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an issued lease and, if in the Department's opinion it was
137found to be invalid, proceed to cancel it administratively.
Especially important in this connection is the following
language:
"The purported lease gave the appellant no
rights whatever in the land or anything therein.
There is no reason why the Departrent should
not have authority to cancel such a lec.se just
the same as if it had been a prospecting; permit ,
'
This change in position, unsupported by any authority except
the negative reasoning quoted above, points to nothing else
but a usurpation by the Secretary of a power which Covigress
refused to grant, and which the Department csrlier conceded
it did not have. Moreover, it was an assximption of a judicial
function, for the premise to t^ie Secretary's reasoning is
that the lease being dealt with was determined by him to be
invalid—not that he would merely treat it as invalid and
defend his position before the courts, if necessary. The
Congress plainly drew a distinction between a lease and a
139permit. The opinion recognizes the distinction, but then
in effect tells the Congress there are no grouinds for the
distinction.
The Act was amended in 1935 to allow the Secretary
to cancel any lease issued after August 21, 1935 for failure
of the lessee to comply with the terms of the lease , provided
the lands covered under the lease were not known to contain
137, Fenelon Boesche, A21230 (Feb, 21, 1938) (Unpublished)
138, Ibid
139, See note 138 supra
140, 49 Stat, 676, 30 U,S.C, §§ 223, 226 (1958)
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valuable deposits of oil and gas. If they did coiitain such
deposits, court proceedings were required to accouiplish can-
cellation. This is the only power to administratively cancel
an outstanding oil and gas lease that has ever been granted
the Secretary, In the Boesche case, supra, there uas no
allegation that he had in any way failed to comply with the
terms of the lease, rather the case was prosecuted on the
grounds the government didn't have title to the land at the
time the lease was executed. The net result was a quiet title
action by administrative fiat.
Since the Boesche case this concept of po^/er has been
broadened considerably. In the latest available edition of
the Secretary's regulations it is provi<Ied that any lease issued
after July 21, 1954 may be cancelled ad::ainistratively for failure
of the lessee to "comply with any. of the provisions of the Act,
141
of the regulations issued thereunder, or of the lease, , ,,"
The purported power here described is obviously much broader
than that claimed in Boesche , and the source of the power to
issue such a regulation is a mystery. The statute plainly
prohibits such action. The pertinent provision of the Leasing
Act concerning cancellation of outstanding leases provides:
"Except as otherx-rise herein provided, cny lease
issued under the provisions of , , , (this Act)
may be forfeited and canceled by an appropriate
proceeding in the United States District Court
for the district in which the property, or some
part thereof, is located x/r.enever the lessee
fails to comply with any of the provisions of
141. 43 CFR 192,161 (Supp 1960)
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'said ... (Act), of the lease, or of the general
regulations promulgated under said, , ,(Act) and
in force at the date of the lease, • ••
• • •
"Any lease issued after August 21, 1935, under
the provisions or section 226 of this title shall
be subject to cancellation by the Secretary of
the Interior after thirty days' notice upon the
failure of the lessee to comply with any of the
provisions of the lease, unless or until the land
covered by any such lease is known to contain
valuable deposits of oil or gas, , ,,"
There is certainly nothing in the section quoted which could
serve as a basis for such a regjlation, A fair reading of the
language would seem to require that if the lessee fails to
comply with any provision of the law, the lease, or the admin-
istrative regulations in force -at the date of issuance of the
lease, a proceeding in an appropriate United States District
Court would be required unless the lease was issued subsequent
to August 21, 1935, in which case it could be cancelled by
the Secretary administratively only for failure to coroly with
the stated lease provisions. And the latter action could be
taken only in case the lands did not contain valuable deposits
of oil and gas. If they did, he would be required to go into
court to cancel the lease for any reason.
Whatever the basis for the argument that such power
resides in the Secretary, it obviously enjoys considerable
vitality in the Department of Interior. In a letter to the
Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
142. 30 U.S,C, § 188 (1958)
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dated February 24, 1960, setting forth the Department's views
on pending legislation which would have specifically prohibited
administrative cancellation of any interest in lands known
to contain valuable deposits of oil and gas, or where
fraud is alleged in the acquisition or holding of any
interest therein, the Under Secretary of Interior stated:
"This is an important material change from the
present lavj since the Secretary now has full
authority to cancel le-.ses, T7hether on producing
or nonprodv'.cinp: acre?.se, where fraud is oroved-
in their acquisition. The present prohibition
on the administrative cancellation of leases
where producing acreage is involved (30 U.S.C,
188) is limited to leases which have been law-
fully issued ." ^^^
Inherent in this view is the premise that the Secretary would make
his own determination as to whether or not the lease had been law-
fully issued or whether fraud was involved, and then proceed to sit
as prosecutor
,
judge and jury in the cases . But the statute
makes no distinction between leases the Secretary believes to
have been unlawfully issued and those he believes to have been
lawfully issued. Such a view casts a continuing cloud, at
least potential even when not actually implemented, over the
leases on untold thousands of acres of public lands.
Moreover, the statute requires that the conditions giving
rise to the cancellation must occur subsequent to issuance of
the lease. Yet a review of the Interior Department decisions
143. Brief for Appellee, p. 13, Pan American Petroleum Corp,
V. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649 (10th Cir 1960). The letter
is printed with minor deletions at page 33 of the brief.
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reveals that at least the majority of the leases cancelled were
cancelled administratively for reasons existing prior to
issuance. In its petition to the Supreme Court in the
Pan American case, the government stated that in the
three year period ending June 30, 1960, 1,129 oil and gas
leases on the public lands were cancelled administratively.
In its brief to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in the Boesche case, the government further states
that "all of these 1,129 cancellations were for reasons exist-
145ing prior to the issuance of the lease," In the Pan
American petition it was further stated that "because of the
size of this (leasing) program, mistakes in its administration
unavoidably occur which require that leases valid on their
face be cancelled administratively for reasons existing; prior
to the issuance of the leases,"
From this statement we must assume the Secretary considers
he has full authority to cancel any lease which he considers
to have been issued by mistake or inadvertance, and, coupled
with the prior statement of the Under Secretary, shows he is
of the opinion his power is unlimited. Practically any case
arising which might be considered for cancellation would fall
in one or the other of those categories for administrative
purposes. It also seems fair to say that not one of the cancellations
144, Petition for certiorari, p. 10, Pan American Petroleum
Corp. V. Pierson, 366 U.S. 936(1961)
145, Op. cit. supra note 132 at 16
146
,




made in the three year period ending June 30, 1960 was
made in accordance with the statutory requirements.
VII
THE TITLE PROBLEM
Perhaps the greatest evil flowing from this practice
is the effect on the title status of the lands affected.
In most instances the title goes out of the government, and
although in some cases it may be voidable it isn't void. In
other cases the act of issuance is void ab initio and no
title passes. The same type of circumstances which prevent
title passage under a land patent will also prevent passage
under a lease. Thus a lease of land issued in violation of
a statute which prohibited its leasing would not take title
out of the government, nor would title pass where the lands
have been validly withdra\\m fi-om leasing and reserved for
other government uses, or where it was already under a valid
147
lease to another. But in cases in V7hich the government
had jurisdiction over lands which were available for leasing
for oil and gas development, and through error or mistake they
were leased, so much of the interest as is covered by the
lease goes out of the government into the hands of the lessee
according to the terms of the lease instrument.
A review of some of the decisions emanating from the
Department of Interior will illustrate the title problems
created by these cancellations. In the case of Bettie H.




Reid, applicant Reid filed for a noncompetitive oil and
gas lease on certain lands in New Mexico on August 19, 1947,
which included the mk sec. 18, T.24S. ,R.29E. , NM PM.
On January 26, 1951, the manager of the cognizant land office
rejected her application as to this land on the grounds the
land had been withdra^m for reclamation purposes. The informa-
tion was erroneous, as only the WijlIE-li; had been withdrawn. The
E?2'NE?4 was available for leasing. On April 5, 1951, one Pipkin
filed for a noncompetitive lease which included the land
aforementioned, and action was taken prospectively to issue
her.a ilease effective June 1, 1951. In the interim Reid learned
of the error of the land officer and filed a subsequent
application which was formally denied on June 19, 1951, and
she appealed. The lease to Pipkin had become effective on
June 1, The Solicitor reversed the decision of the Director
of the Bureau of Land Management, ordered Pipkin's lease to
the land cancelled, the land offered to Reid, and a lease
was issued to her.
149Charles D. Edmonson involved three cases which x-iere
consolidated into a single opinion by' the Solicitor of the
Department of Interior, In the Edmonson case, one Elmgren's
application for a noncompetitive lease to a certain 40-acre
tract was rejected on the grounds the land had either been
patented without reservation of the oil and gas to the United
States or had been leased to another. Elmgren did not appeal,
148. 61 I.D. 1 (1952)
149. 61. I.D. 355(1954)
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Edmonson then filed for the same 40-acre tract but before
action was taken on his application Elmgren was allowed to
amend his application, on the grounds the prior rejection was
in error, and obtain a lease on the land. Edmonson appealed.
In the second case, one Graham filed for a noncompetitive
lease on 2,560 acres of land. His application was rejected
on the grounds the lands were included in an Indian Reservation.
He did not appeal from the rejection and the land was sub-
sequently leased to two other individuals. Graham then requested
reinstatement of his application and cancellation of the issued
leases. These requests were denied and he appealed.
In the third case, J. R, Gillbergh filed an application
for a noncompetitive lease on 'land in the Ashley National Forest.
This application was rejected on the grounds the land had been
patented without reservation of the oil and gas to the United
States. He then filed another application for a lease on other
land in the Forest which was also rejected, partially on the
grounds that part of the land was State owned and partially
because a portion of the land was erroneously believed to
have been patented without reservation of the oil and gas.
The land was subsequently leased to four other individuals.
Gillbergh then appealed from the rejections and the Associate
Director of the Bureau of Land Management held the four leases
for cancellation and reinstated Gillbergh 'h applications. One
of Che lessees appealed.
The Solicitor, in the course of his opinion, reviewed the




. . the lease (betrceen the United Stc^ites
and Pipkin) V7as a binding linstrurtent with
respect to both parties and could not be vit-
iated by unilateral action .... Accord-
ingly, it seems clear tbc-t r binding; con-
tract existed between the (^^?rties) . . .
at the tiine Mrs. Reid filed her application
for reinstateTTient ."^^*^ (Errahasis supplied)
It is impossible to reconcile the Solicitor's language with the
action in the Reid case. Moreover, after this solemn pronounce-
ment as to the binding nature of the federal oil and gas leases, it
took approximately three pages of the opinion for him to reach
the conclusion to cancel the leases of three lessees in these
cases.
In another case a prior lessee relinquished a lease on
certain acquired lands on July, 7, 1949. On August 8, 1950,
the Assistant Director of the Bureau of Land Management can-
celed the lease effective July 7, 1949. The cancellation
was not noted on the acquired lands plat records in the Wash-
ington office unti~l September 15, 1954. In the meantime, one
Van Arsdale filed an application to lease the saiae lands
on a noncompetitive basis on October 22, 1951, and was issued a
lease September 1, 1954. On September 23, 1954, the Minerals
Officer of the Bureau of Land Management canceled the lease
on the grounds the regulations •^^'^ then in effect provided
150. Id at 363
151. B. E. Van Arsdale, 62 I.D. 475 (1955)
152. 43 CFR 192.43 (Supp 1953)
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that the lands were not available fox leasing, following
relinquishment or cancellation of a lease, until sudi fact
had been noted on the appropriate tract book.
In none of the cases discussed above had the lessee in
any way violated the terms of the lease. The decisions of
the Department of Interior in connection thsrewith are devoid
of any suggestion that the lessee had not respected the terms
of his agreement. It can be seen from the facts involved
that the grounds advanced in support of cancellation were in
existence at the time of issuance of the lease and were known,
or could have been known, to the officers of the cognizant
land offices.
These Secretarial decisions cannot be squared with the land
patent cases, nor does there seem to be any reasonable basis
on which oil and gas leasehold-property interests can be dis-
tinguished from the land patent as to avoid the analogy with
those cases. We turn now to the court decisldns" specifically
concerned witii cancellation of issued federal oil and gas leases




JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE CANCELLATIONS
Few cases involving the legality of administrative
cancellation of oil and gas leases have been before the
courts. While-^this may seem strange in view of the large
number of cancellations \^ich the Department of Interior
153
admits have been made, the great majority of these cases
involve rather minor acreage in purely wildcat territory.
The investment involved was relatively small and in the
majority of cases it would have been more costly to litigate
the matter than accept the decision and lose the investment.
Few lessees would take the time and expense to fight the
cancellation of a leasehold interest having no special
value—the usual status of most undeveloped oil and gas
leases, federal and private. The Pan American '^^'^ case
would probably have gone the way of the cases just discussed
had it not been a minority situation involving acreage of
proven value. It requires no particular argument, however,
to demonstrate that security of title throughout these lease-
holds is essential if the risks are to be taken which will
lead to discovery of the small but valuable part of the whole
which does contain oil and gas in coifcr.arcial quantities.
The instances in which the alleged power has been challenged
present some rather interesting decisions. The Court of Appeals
153. See note 14^ supra '
154. 284 F.2d 649 (1960)
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for the District of Colubmia expressed its view on the
limitation of administrative action in connection with the
threatened cancellation of an oil and gas lease some thirty
years ago in Bell Oil & Gas Comipany v. Wilbur . There the
Secretary of Interior threatened to cancel some leases on
government land for failure of the lessee to pay 15 cents per
barrel above posted field price for royalty oil, and the
lessee sued to enjoin, him from instituting cancellation pro-
ceedings 6r interfering x%rith the operation of the leases.
The decree of the loiter court dismissing the complaint was
affirmed on the ground the lessee had an adequate remedy at
law, but in the course of the opinion the court said:
"The Secretary, under the terms of the Act, has
no power by his ovtc fiat to cancel these leases.
He is required to go into a District Court of
the United States to accorriolish that result by
a proceeding in equity, "'•^"
It will be observed here that this case arose prior to the
1935 amendment which gave the Secretary his limited
authority to cancel leases for failure to comply with the
lease provisions. Hence, considered alongside the statute
as it was then worded, it was the view of the court that the
Secretary was totally without pox^er to cancel a lease for any
reason. Proper statutory construction would indicate that
this continues to be the situation except for the one stat-
158
utory exception created since this decision.
155, 50 F,2d 1070 (1931)
156, Id at 1071
157, See note 139 supra




McKay v, Wahlenmaler was decided twenty- six years
later by the same court. Some of the language in that opinion
has done more to bolster the Secretary's view that he not only
has the power but the duty to administratively cancel oil
and gas leases he considers to have been improperly issued
than any case that has been decided in connection with the
public lands.
In that case one Culbertson was president and owner of
23.7 per cent of the capital stock of Culbertson & Irwin, Inc.,
a corporation engaged in the oil and gas business. The
corporation filed an application for certain lands in New
Mexico on which a prior lease had been canceled. The
Secretary had determined that all applications fildd before a
certain date would be considered simultaneous filings and a
160
drawing would be held to deterraine the priority of applicants.
159. 226 F.2d 35 (1935)
160, 43 CFR 192.43(1954) provided: "Where a noncotqietitive
lease is canceled or relinquished. . . the lands (are
not available until) the notation of the cancellation
or relinquishment is made on the tract book, . .." It
is further provided that priority of applicants shall
be determined by clrsixaing (43 CFR 192.43(d) , 255.8 (Supp.
1961)) The specific regulation (43 CFR 192.42 (c)
(Supp 1946) Culbertson allegedly violated provided:
"A statement of the interests, direct and indirect,
held by the applicant in oil and gas leases, and applica-
tions therefor on public lands in the sajie State,
identifying by serial number the records x/aerein such
interests may be found" was required to be filed with the
application. 43 CFR 192.42(e) 3(1954) requires disclosure
of whether or not these holdixigs mil exceed the allowable
acreage under the statute. Part (f) of subparagraph 6
thereof requires a corporation to disclose "the names and
addresses of the stockholders holding 20% or more of the
stock in the corporation." It does not appear the corpor-
ation made such a disclosure in this case.
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Two days later Culbertson filed an applicntion for the same
land, Irwin, a vice-president of the corporation and owner
of 19,3 per cent of the capital stock, then filed a like
application the day after Culbertson filed. No application
made reference to the other two. The applications were identical
in form, p?:epared in the same office of the corporation, were
dated, signed, and acknowledged before the same notary, though
filed on separate days. The drawing was held and Culbertson 's
name was drawn first, Wahlenatnier ' s name V7as drawn second.
After a lease was issued to Culbertson, Wahlenmaier
was notified his off6r was rejected for the reason that a
lease had been issued to Culbertson, Wahlarjnaier protested,
calling the Secretary's attention to the fccts set forth
above. The Secretary found Culbertson had violated the
regulations requiring disclosure of his interests as a share-
holder in his corporation's federal oil and gas leases but
refused to cancel Culbertson's le^se, Wahlenmaier filed suit
in which he asked the court to adjudge Culbertson not a qualified
applicant. He also asked that the Secretary be directed to
cancel the lease to Culbertson and issue one to him. The relief
was granted and the Secretary appealed. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed the judgment, holding
that the Secretary was bound by his ami regulations and that
161he was "plainly wrong in refusing to cancel the lease, , ,,"





It further observed that:
"The Secretary's decision was probably based on
confusion as to the nature of the question before
him, and misapprehension of Yiin oT-m poT7er and duty
to cancel, « . (the) lease, , ,^ "^'^'^ (Emphasis
supplied)
Apparently the reasoning behind the Secretary's refusal
to act was that the regulation was design.! to point up
situations in which the lessee, if the requested lease was
issued, would receive more than the maxim -m allowable acreage.
When he deteinnined the issuance of the Ici oe would not give
Culbertson more than the allowable acreag^n, he concluded the
violation was of no consequence. Also, the contest was primarily
between Culbertson and Wahlenraaier and it is sometimes the
practice of the Department to refrain from entering into disputes
between contesting claimants when Departraental action would
163
not restore the lands to the public domain.
Significantly, neither Wahlenraaier nor the Secretary
164
urged the prior precedent of the Bell C! t. & Gas Coropany
case, and for a very good reason. Neither party was interested
in attacking the Secretary's power to cancel the lease,
Wahlenmaier wanted Secretarial cancellatioa and the Secretary
had no interest in attacking his frequently asserted power
which he had simply chosen not to exercise in this case, Tlxus
no party was before the court that w-tg interested in raising
the fundamental question and there is no indication in the
162. Ibid
163. See Copper Belt Silver & Mining Co., 54 I,D, 475 (1934)
164. See note 155 supra
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opinion that the court dealt with the problem on any deeper
basis than the issue posed to it by the parties. So analyzed, the
Wahlenmaier decision becomes a weak precedent indeed, for only
in cases in which issues are squarely litigated are strong prec-
edents found.
The language quoted from Wahlenm?,ier , supra, would seem
to indicate the Secretary has the duty to cancel any lease he
deteirmines to have been improperly issued, regardless of reason.
In view of the court's position, it could also be argued that
165
the statute is not a limitation on the exercise of his power
in this respect, despite its express language and history. This
is the exact position now taken by the Department of Interior,
and we find VTahlenm?.ier being cited in support of cancellation
166
after cancellation since the case was decided.
In 1958 the same court decided Seaton v. The Texas Conipanv^"^
in which the Secretary relied upon WrhlenTaier to support his
departmental action. There, one Dorough had applied for a non-
competitive lease on certain lands in North Dakota in 1948,
Having received no word after a period of time, he vrrot& the
regional land office at Billings, Montana that if any part of
the land included in his application was acquired land, he
desired "this letter (be considered as) fortcal notice that it
165. 30 U.S.C. I 226 (1958)
166. For example, see L, S, GranEner, 66 loD, 201 (1959);
Malcolm C, Petrie, 66 I,D, 288 (1959); Duncan Miller,
66 I.D, 388 (1959),
167. 256 F.2d 718 (D.C, Cir, 1958)
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is ray desire that the matter be forcvrarded to your proper land
168
office in order that an oil and gas lease can be issued,"
He was advised that a certain 40-acre tract was acquired land
and to file a new application for that land. Instead, he
wrote the regional office and requested his application be
forwarded to Washington and treated as an application for
lease of acquired lands to preserve its filing date and priority.
He re-filed an application for the lands stated by the land
office to be public domain land. He was issued an acquired
land lease on the 40 acres on December 1, 1951. After Dorough
filed but before his lease issued, one Snyder filed for a
noncompetitive public domain lease upon the same lands. His
application was rejected, but the rejection revoked upon
discovery that, while the surface was acquired land, the title
to the oil and gas therein had at all times remained in the
United States and was still a part of the public domain. The
lease therefore issued to Snyder excluding the 40 acres was
then amended to include this tract, which was also covered by
Borough's prior lease. Dorough, meanwhile, had assigned his
lease to. The Texas Company, Though not producing acreage
itself, oil and gas development in the area brought this 40
acres in issue into close proximity with producing acreage.
Accordingly, it had real value and formed the basis for a
real contest.
Snyder requested that Dorough 's lease be cancelled as to
168. The Texas Company, 61 I.D. 367, 368 (1954)
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the 40 acres in question. The Chief of the Division of
Minerals of the Bureau of Land Manageaient canceled Borough's
lease, without notice, as to the 40 acres. An appeal to the
Secretary of the Interior resulted in affirmance of the can-
cellation. The Texas Company then filed suit in district
court. That court ordered the Secretary to restore the lease
to The Texas Company and directed Snyder to surrender his
lease to the Secretary for cancellation. The Secretary and
Snyder appealed.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Coltsmbia
rendered two decisions in the case. If the first opinion had
been allowed to stand it would have been a considerable con-
tribution to an overall solution to the problem. The first
169
opinion was rendered on October 3, 1937, but before it
was printed a rehearing was granted and that opinion was
withdrawn and a second opinion substituted for it. The first
opinion stated:
"But we think that Dorough's lease, even if in
some manner irregular, had acquired a status
which necessitated judicial proceedings for
its outright cancellation. Among the powers
conferred by Congress upon the Secretary Xi/e
find none which authorized his action in this
case. If it exists it must be implied, for it
is nowhere expressed. And the relevant con-
siderations weigh against implying the power, , ,,
It has long been held that once a patent to
public land is granted by the United States
it may be canceled only by a court in
judicial proceedings, and not merely on a
limited judicial review of previous admin-
istrative cancellation, , ,,
169. See Appendix I
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"We think McKay v« Wghlanmaxf:-' , , , <?o»?.s not -
decide that admlntstratlyg cancel iTifclon was
available to the Secrtrtrry in the prarient case .
There we held that the Cuibertson lease should
be cancelled, and ordered the Secretary to
cancel it. We did say also that the Secretary
could have cancelled in the situation there
presented, but the fact is the caacoll?.tion
was ordered by the court as a result of a
iudicial proceecan<y , , .," ^^^ (Emphasis
supplied)
The disapproval above set forth is sufficiently broad to cover
any cancellation except those specifically provided for in
the statute,^ '^ Obviously it would prohibit any of the admin-
istrative cancellations hereinbefore discussed. If the covirt
tneant what it said, then it is difficult to reconcile the
strong disapproval of the Secretary's action and the later
Intimation (if indeed such was intended) that he might have can-
celled the lease in the Wahlenmaier case. It seems clear the "
court did not mean to imply the Secretary could himself make a deter-
mination as to tbe validity of title, for certainly Congress has
not bestowed that power upon him. And it is apparent that the
court, having unduly extended itself in the Wahlemaier case,
was here trying to loose itself from the bonds of some rather un-
fortunate language.
Another portion of the quoted language which is especially
significant is that in which the lease is considered analogous
to a land patent. This appears to be the first time such an
analogy was drawn by a court. This concept was carried over
into the published second opinion in the cjse, though as dictum.
170. Ibid
171. 30 U.S.C. § 188 (1958)
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and was also stated and approved by Judge Breitenstein in
172the Pan American case.
The second opinion '^ in tt^e case actually turned on
the more limited ground that the cancellation was not "valid
administrative action," Ther<£ is not avuch comfort for the
Secretary in the modified ground adopted in the opinion,
however, for the court reasserted the essential validity of
Its first opinion when it said:
"If the cancellation of the Dorough Icnse was not
permissible under the principles of t'la land pat-
ent cases it should be set aside. If cancellation
was not permissible as valid administrctive action
of the Secretary it should be set aoicle for that
reason. We think it x^7as not valid adninistrative
action. This makes it unnecessary to cope with
the applicability o£ the land pilrcnt cases, and
we accordingly withdraw our opinion of October 3,
1957" 174
Perhaps the court here was choosing a ground for decision
which sounded less opprobrious to the Secretary, but the fact
remains that if the lease is analogous to the land patent it
could hardly be x<rithin his power to cancel it xi^ithout authority
of statute or the courts. Such action would clearly not be
valid administrative action.
It has been suggested''-'^ that the cases just discussed
may have prompted the Secretary to initiate the administrative
proceedings which gave rise to Pan American PetroleriiT Corp .
172. 284 F.2d at 655
173. 256 F.2d 718 (1958)
174. Id at 721
175. Stull, Authority of the Secretary of the Interior to
Oancel Noncompetitive Oil and Gas Leases by Administra-




V, Plerson . Considering the language of the opinions, this
is perhaps a reasonable answer as to vhy such action v/as taken,
although none of those cases represent such an extraordinary
claim of power as does Pan Arnarican , There it was alleged
that one Davis, the original lessee, with others, conspired
to obtain leases by fraud for the purpose of enabling Davis
to obtain acreage exceeding allowable limits under the Leasing
Act . Some of these leases had found their way into the
hands of bona fide purchasers for value, including Fan American,
Some of the leases were producing, others V7ere not producing
but were knoxvm to contain oil and gas, while others xo'ere
neither producing nor known to contain oil and gas. It can
readily be seen that at least some of the leases fell squarely
within the statutory prohibition against cancellation by admin-
istrative proceedings even for violation of the lease pro-
visions. ^^^
Upon initiation of the proceedings. Pan American filed
a petition for injunctive relief in the Wyoming District
Court on the grounds that the only remedy available to the
Secretary was a proceeding instituted by the Attorney General
of the United States in the United States District Court for
the district in. which the leased property was located or in
which the lease owner might be found; that no power existed
in the Secretary or his subordinates to cancel such leases
176. See note l54 supra
177. 30 U.S.C. I 184 (1958)
178. 30 U.S.C. § 188 (1958)
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administratively; and that the proceedings were unauthorized
and a direct violation of the statute. The District Judge
dismissed the complaint on the grounds the Secretary of
179
Interior was an indispensable party, but in doing so he
observed that:
"From what I have said I hold the Supervisor is
proceeding in contravention of the clear mandate
of the statute, his mm regulations, and in
violation of the terms of the lease when he pro-
ceeds administratively to cancel leases on lands
known to contain valuable oil and gas deposits.
This prerogative Congress has reserved to the
courts." 1°^
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the
contention the Secretary was an indispensable party on the
grounds that the relief sought required no action by either
the Secretary or any subordinate; that there was no effort
to compel the exercise of power or authority, but an effort
to prevent the alleged \7r0ngful exercise of claimed power and
authority by a local land official; and that since the relief
sought would operate only upon the locr.l land officers, it
vJDuld suffice to restrain them from proceeding administratively.
The court went on to consider the applicable provisions of the
181Leasing Act and the government's contention that retention
of the fee title in the case of an oil and gas lease rendered
the land patent cases inapplicable. It brushed aside the claim
that the prohibitions against administrative cancellation was
179, The court relied upon Richman v. Beck, 257 F.2d 575
(10th Cir 1958); cf Uilliams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490 (1947)
180, Pan American petroleum Corp, v, Pierson, 181 F, Supp,
557, 563 (D, Wyo. 1960)
181, 30 U.S.C. §i 184, 188 (1958)
-70-

not applicable to cases in which the la^a^ had been procured
by fraud, saying that it made no differ ance whether the
lessee be deemed to acquire title to the oil and gas in
place or upon severance from the reservoir because the lease-
hold was in the nature of a profit a prendre* In each case,
said the court, the issuance of the lease vras the last act
required of the government to vest in the lessee the right to
conduct explorations upon the land, prorlace, market and sell
the oil and gas found underlying the preinises; and that this
act carried the same character of finality as did the issuance
of a patent to the non-rdneral lands of the public domgin. It
went on to say that the difference between the patent and lease
was no reason for a denial of the power to administratively
cancel the patent but recognize it in the case of an oil and
gas lease, unless Congress had authorized exercise of the
power. In this connection the court farther stated:
"The courts have repeatedly held that h^ (the Secre-
tary) is without power to annul a patent once it
has issued. That pov/er is reserved to She courts
.
In the absence of soTe SoC':iitory provisions giving
him power to annul ledges urd&r the Mineral Le?.sing
Act« that pc"rer is also reserved to the cocrts. , , ,
Otherwise, the new system created by the Mineral
Leasing Act for the disposition of the Mineral reserves
found on the public lands fails of its purpose.
Certainty of title is an elementary prerequisite
for the sound development of any mineral resource ."
In concluding the opinion the court opined that the Secretary
has a right to investigate matters in connection with his admin-
istration of the Leasing Program under the Leasing Act , and
182. 284 F.2d at 655
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if in such investigations he finds circvimstances indicating
wrongful conduct which appear to justify cancellation of the
lease, the action must be brought in tha courts and not before
the agency which made the investigation.
The Secretary thereupon filed a requost for a hearing
en banc and a petition for rehearing, V zh were denied on the
grounds that "the defendant officials are without authority
to cancel an oil and gas lease for fraud of a lessee precedent
to lease issuance, "^°^
Judge Breitenstein*s opinion is an excellent treatment
of the limitations upon Secretarial powers under the Leasing
Act, and, it is submitted, properly equates the finality in
lease issuance to that of the patent. The supplemental state-
ments in the denial of rehearing, however, raise the question
as to whether or not the court was attempting to limit the
scope of its previous opinion to cases in which fraud was
alleged in procurement of leases. It doesn't seem logical
to entertain the presumption that any such result was intended.
The heart of the decision rests upon the premise that once the
title to any interest, either leasehold or fee, leaves the
government it is then beyond the reach of administrative
action. Whether the cause of its passage was fraud, mistake
or error, makes no difference. The point of the matter is that
it has gone. Underlying this view is the court's recognition
183. Id at 657
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of the problems flowing from uncertainty of title created
by "administrative cancellations" which, as a practical
matter, put the lessee in an iiroossibla position.
184, Under the regulations (43 CFR 2//>.„':Cb) (Srpp IS 63)) the
Director of Geological Survey has control over enforce-
tnent of the provisions of the regulations pertaining
to operations. Under his administrative direction is a
Supervisor over the district wherein the lands are
located who has the responsibility of enforcement of
the law and regulations in that district, Tlie Super-
visor has the authority to require a lessee to produce
evidence that the lease is in "good standing" before
permitting operations on the l.tnd (43 CFR 221,5
(Supp I960)), If the Secretary is contesting the valid-
ity of a lease it is highly unlikely that the lessee
will be able to get permission from the Supervisor-
even if he were foolhardy enough to atte:r:pt it—to con-
duct drilling operations on the land. The expense and
risk involved is notorious, and might well mean
economic ruin for the lessee if the should be forced to
forego development of a property iot a prolonged period
of time. The cloud on the title may jeopardize the sale
of production from the lands as well. Inherent Ir: this
situation is also the potential threat, even though a
lease title is not yet challenged, which cop;pels the
lessee alx/ays to act at this peril if the Secretary's
position is correct.
The problem is not confined to isolated instances. The
Pan American case involved a total of 87 defendants
and 86 leases. In a subsequent action within approximately
six months of that case, the Department initiated pro-
ceedings against 147 defendants in an attack on the
validity of 374 leases. See Hearings on S, 2181, S, 1496,
S,1497, S,1272, S.2308, S,852, S.053, and S,2389 Before
a Subcommittee of the Seioate Comaaittee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 86th Cong, 1st, Sess, 112 (1959) for
a discussion of these cases and the problems Involved.

Neither the near-miss in Seaton v, Tha Texas CQrip?.ny^*^-'
nor the defeat in Pan Airerican PetroleuTa Corp. v» Plsrson ^
seems to have blunted the Department's desire for further
litigation of the issue. There is now pending on appeal another
suit °' which was occasioned by an attempt by the Secretary to
cancel an outstanding lease on the grounds that issuance of
the lease violated one of his own regulations, requiring that
no offer to lease
",
, . may be made for less than 640 acres except
where the offer is accompanied by a shoc/ing that
the lands are in an approved unit or cooperative
plan of operstion or such a plsn which has been
approved as to form by the Director of the
Geological Survey, or \yhexe the land is surrounded,
by lands not available for leasing under the act," ^°°
In that case one Boesche filed an application to lease
the W^ mk of Sec. 21, T,22N., R,16W., Indian Meridian,
Oklahoma, on September 11, 1956, Also available for leasing
at the time was the NW'4 SW-^ which, according to the above
regulation, should have been included therein. Subsequently,
on the same day, two other persons filed an offor to lease
the entire acreage. On November 15, 1957 a lease was issued
to Boesche covering the WJj NM^, The other applications were
accordingly denied and the applicants appealed. The Director
of the Bureau of Land I-lanagement reversed the denial and held
Boesche 's lease for canc,ellation. This action was affirmed
185. 256 F.2d 718 (1958)
186. 284 F,2d 649 (1960)
187. Boesche's Administrator v. Udall, Civ. No. 16,238
(D,C. Cir, April 16, 1961)
188. 43 CFR 19Z.42(d) (Supp 1960)
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by the Secretary of the Interior, Boasche died and his
administrator filed suit on September 4, 1959 in the District
Court for the District of Columbia seeking to enjoin, pendente
lite, the Secretary from cancelling the lease, to review his
actions, and to declare that no authority existed for can-
cellation of the lease. The District Court in & memorandum
opinion concluded that ". • • the Secretary of the Interior
may cancel or direct the cancellation of a lease covering the
same lands erroneously issued by a subordinate to another
189
applicant." The court thereupon dismissed the complaint
and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals has not
rendered a decision in the case.
It is quite obvious the trial Judge considered this to
be "valid administrative action" and that the principles of
the land patent cases did not apply. There appears to be no
difference in the government's position in relation to the
title in this case than the cases previously discussed. What-
ever title it had to the leasehold passed to Boesche upon
execution of the instrument, since the breach of the regulation
did not destroy the jurisdiction of the Department to issue
the lease. If this be so, it is difficult to imagine how the
court could reach such a conclusion in the face of the plain
language of the statute and the holding of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in The Texas Cotnpany^^" case.
189. Op. cit, supra note 131 at 5
190. 256 F,2d 718(1958)
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This decision is also squarely in opposition to the Tenth
191
Circuit's holding in the Pan American case. It appears
the trial judge assumed a power in the Secretary which t\70
circuit courts, one his own, have indicated does not exist,
IX
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROSLEM
192The Leasing Act does nothing more than provide the
basic framework for disposal of the mineral resources on the
193public lands. It left to the Secretary the responsibility
of providing such regulations as might be required to carry
into effect the legislative intent. In this connection he
was given V7ide discretionary powers as to how or by what method
he would secure compliance with the statutory scheme. If the
purpose of the law is not to be frustrated, this discretionary
power is necessary, else the flexibility of action necessary
to meet varying situations arising in the administration of
the Act is absent. These powers are no different here than
he possessed under prior land laws.
The courts have respected the exercise of these discretionary
powers in the administration of the laws relating to disposal
of the public lands for over three quarters of a century. In
Gaines v. Thompson «^^^ one of the early land patent cases, the
Supreme Court refused to enjoin the Commissioiter of the Land
Office and the Secretary of the Interior from taking action
191, 284 F,2d 649 (1960)
192, 30 U,S,C, §§ 181-287 (1958)
193, 30 U,S,C. § 189 (1958)
194, 74 U.S, 347 (1868)
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which required interpretation of a pol:^it of law prior to
disposal of land on the grounds such action was vdLthin their
administrative jurisdiction, involving an exercise of dis-
cretionary power, and to grant injunctive relief would be arf
improper intrusion into the Executive area. But the court
has also recognized that, vi^ien the last act required under
the legislative scheme has been performed, there is no
room for further exercise of the discretionary power. Thus
if all the requirements preceding the issuance of a patent have
been met by the applicant, mandamus will lie to compel its
195
execution and delivery.
The purpose of the Leasing Act was to provide for orderly
exploration, development and disposal of mineral resources on
the public lands .^^ Under the terras of the Act it V7as pro-
vided that this should be accomplished under a leasing pro-
cedure, and that the S6cretary should be delegated the '
responsibility of attending to the issuance of these leases
so that the resources might be developed. From this it would
appear that the purpose of the statute also defines the limita-
tions of his administrative power, for necessarily included
within the positive delegation of the power is the basic
premise that its exercise will not be extended beyond the
requirements of the legislative scheme. Once the purpose is
197
accomplished, the agency power under the grant is ended.
195. Lane v, Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174(1917)
196. West V, Work, 11 F,2d 828 (1926), Cert, denied 271 U,S,
689 (1926)




As the agency moves beyond that limit it loses administra-
tive jurisdiction over the subject matter; if it then proceeds
to take away a vested property interest, it violates the
Constitutional requirement of due process.
In this country, the citizenry ha.v& always looked to the
courts for a fair and impartial determination of their vested
rights concerning property. Whether the right arises from
government action or in the conduct of purely private relations
with other citizens is imaiaterial. Underlying this view is
the cherished notion that determination of such rights is, in
the final analysis, properly a judicial function, in the
exercise of which the Executive Department of the government
has no right to intrude. If this is not so, our faith in
the solemn pronouncement contained in the Fifth Amendment is
misplaced.
The difficulty here is that the Secretary does not con-
sider himself limited to the purposes of the statute and has
taken it upon himself to exercise administrative power over
an issued lease \^ich Congress has refused to give and the
courts have refused to recognize. He steadfastly refuses to
accept the proposition that the lease passes the leasehold
title out of the United States in accordance with, and to the
extent of, the terms of the leasing instrument. He considers
the lease not a final disposal at all, but rather the grant
of a privilege which remains within his total administrative
power at all times to either honor or destroy. Since the
government retains legal title to the fee, it is contended
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the xjmbilical cord of ofwnership is not severed to a
sufficient degree to warrant a denial of the exercise of
complete administrative control over the leasehold during
its existence. This position is not only refuted by the terms
of the statute and its legislative history, •"•"° but the deci-
199ions of the courts as well.
As earlier mentioned, the majority of the cases in which
the exercise of this alleged power has occurred have been
those in which the lease has been allegedly issued in viola-
tion of Departmental Regulations. One writer has opined that:
",
, .an unyielding rule, either that a lease is
always subject to cancellation if the application
disregards a regulation or that a lease is
forever beyond recall as soon as it is approved
by the manager and delivered, will not meet the
needs of varying situations.
It is submitted that the delivery of a lease to
the lessee should be held not to constitute a
final issuance of the lease, so long as there
are pending any other applications, until all
the pending applications have been adjudicated
and the applicants have had an opportunity to
appeal." ^00
No arguitcnt can be advanced against the view that the need for
stability of title and finality of administrative action demands
that the rules be uniformly applied, and that there be a point
198, See page 46 supra
199, Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649
(10th Clr 1960); Seaton v. The Texas Company, 256 F.2d
718 (D.C. Clr 1958); Lell Oil & Gas Company v. Wilbur,
50 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir 1931)
200, Haughey, Problems in Examination of Titles to United




beyond which the lease is irnorane ftom attack by administrative
action. Nor can it be denied that it should be subject to
attack after issuance for such things as fraud in procurement.
The only problnm is how the result may be accomplished and
at the saiae tinie protect the interests of the government, the
lessee and parties aggrieved by failure to obtain a lease
whose equities may be superior to those of the lessee.
It is submitted that the above suggestion will not provide
the solution to the problem. The Bureau of Land Management
now has the power to delay issuance of the lease as long as
may be required to make its determinations as to satisfaction
of statutory requirements, and the issuance of a provisional
lease would not afford any in^rovcd device to accoinplish that
objective, I'rcsumably, the validity of the lease would depend
upon proceedings had after its issuance and, if adverse to
the provisional lessee, it could be recalled and cancelled
by the Secretary, all through his o%m administrative machinery.
The only course open to the Secretary as the law is now xrritten
is to leave matters concerning cancellation, except in cases
involving a breach of the lease provisions by the lessee, to
the judici.:.ry. To allow further administrative proceedings
affecting title after issuance of the lease, even x^ith Congressional
sanction, is to invite usurpation of judicial functions by adniin-
istrative fiat. Moreover, it does not appear such provisional
issuance of a lease would in any way benefit the lessee. It
would be foolhardy for him to make any preparation to work
the lease until the administrative machinery ground its way
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through all the applications and delivered him a firm lease.
It is further submitt^ that the proper way to view the
matter is that once the Secretary or his delegatee has deter-
mined an applicant is qualified under the statute, meets its
requirements as to his right to receive a lease, and thereafter
Issues the lease, the subject matter has then passed beyond
his control and is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Judiciary except in those instances in which Congress has
expressly allowed administrative cancellation. At this point






The Secretary urges that he must have the administrative
power over federal leases for which he contends because the
volume of erroneously issued leases is so great, and court pro-
ceedings so tedious, so as to make any but his own administra-
te2tive processes too burdensome upon the government. The
short answer to this contention is that administrative con-
venience cannot form a valid basis for the divestiture of
vested property rights, and the answer is certainly i\Tiplicit
In the court decisions Just considered.
Beyond this, however, the Secretary's position will not
bear practical analysis.
In the first place, the problem is no greater than in the
201. 284 F.2d at "654
202. Op. clt. supra note 132 at 22
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land patent cases—probably not nearly so great--and denial
of such a power in those cases seems not to have produced un-
toward consequences.
In the second place, it is well to recognize the limited
interest of the United States in its leases. There is no
selection of lessees in any sense of technical or financial
qualifications. Any of millions of persons are acceptable,
and the only concern of the United States is that the rentals
and royalties called for by the lease are paid. Thus, in
the usual situation it makes no difference who holds a lease
203
and discharges the obligations under its terms. This is
not to suggest that the case will never arise in which the
Secretary will wish to initiate action leading to a cancella-
tion, but it is suggested that in the overwhelming majority
of cases he can leave the contest to private litigation be-
tween the leaseholder and other aggrieved parties who believe
203, 30 U.S.C.A. § 187a provides in part that: ", • , (A)ny
oil or gas lease issued under the authority of , , ,
this title may be assigned or subleased, as to all or
part of the acreage included therein, subject to final
approval by the Secretary and as to either a divided
or undivided interest therein, to apy person or persons
qualified to oim a lease under, , .(this title). The
Secretary shall dis?t)prove the assi?T"Tnent or sublease
only for lack of qualification of the assignee or for
lack of sufficient bond ." lie also has authority to
disapprove an assigrunent of a separate zone or
deposit under any lease or of a part of a legal sub-
division as a matter of discretion, (Emphasis supplied)
-82-

their rights to particular leasehold acreage superior to
those o£ the lessee. The patent cases point the way.
Johnson v. Towsley^^ was a case between private persons
contesting who should have the l^nd, the. patent for which
had been issued. After trial on the merits it was decreed
that a trust should be impressed on the patent held by one
of the parties, whose rights were determined to be inferior
to those of the other party. This means that the act of die
United States in passing title was undisturbed, the court
undertaking only to lodge the title thereby granted in the
person entitled to it.
A moment's reflection will show the desirability of this
rule. Few matters lend themselves to a black or v^ite analysis.
Let us suppose that a patent or lease is erroneously issued,
but has passed to a bona fide purchaser. The bona fide pur-
205
chaser should prevail.
Let us suppose that a patent or lease is erroneously
issued in such fashion that, from the beginning, another party
was better entitled, but since that time the original holder
204. 80 U.S. 72 (1871)
205. The Act of September 21, 1959, 73 Stat. 571, 30 U.S.C.A,
§ 184, gave some relief to the bona fide purchaser.
This law provides that any party to a proceeding shall
be promptly dismissed upon a showing that he acquired
the interest involving him in the matter as a bona
fide purchaser. There is, however, one situation which
deserves comment. If a company or individual engages
the services of a broker to procure leases and the broker
violates the law. The Secretary might take the position
that an agency relationship existed, thus placing the
leaseholder beyond the provisions of the amendment.
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has expended many hundreds of thousands of dollars and by
the risk of such expenditures has discovered an oil pool
worth millions of dollars. Is the party originally having
the right to the lease better entitled to take all on a
mere showing of such superior right?
Let us suppose that there was no other applicant, so
that the contest, if any, is between the United States and
the leaseholder. Though the United States might initially
have had cancellation, is it to have that right here when great
expense has been incurred and the prize found?
Perhaps, but it should be obvious in all these situaticns
that the proper forum is a court sitting in equity that is
able to balance equities, not only as these existed at issuance
but that since may have accrued, and that has power, through
an appropriate conditional decree if necessary, to do sub-
stantial justice among the parties as it finds them. The
Secretary cannot perform such a function. He is not a court
sitting in equity, nor is there any way in which he can be
raised to such status.
It is submitted that the problem breaks down into two
categories:
(1) A minority of cases where, usually as a matter
of principle, the Secretary may wish to proceed
in accordance with his statutory authority to
seek cancellation of an issued lease that he be-
lieves to be voidable. Sometimes, too, the Sec-
retary may wish to effect cancellation of wholly
-84«-

void Instruments to remove title clouds from land
which he is charged with leasing. Usually this
will not be necessary as the Secretary's sugges-
tion of voidness will result in the lessee allow-
ing his challenged lease to lapse for non-pay-
ment of rentals or he will surrender it.
(2) A majority of cases involving issued leases which
can be left to litigation between leaseholders
and aggrieved parties, including unsuccessful appli-
cants. In these cases the courts, through appli-
cation of principles of equity, can do sub-
stantial justice among the parties. Included
will be situations of conflicting issued leases,
one of which is necessarily void, where a lit-
igant desires to remove the cloud of the void
instrument from the valid leasehold title.
Johnson v. Towslev^Q^ teaches that this latter category of
cases can be brought in the courts of the jurisdiction in which
the lands lie, including state courts. That case, involving the
patent contest previously alluded to, was tried In the Nebraska
State courts prior to review by the United States Supreme Court,
A contest over an Issued federal oil and gas lease does not in-
volve any property interest of the United States, for its under-
lying fee interest (or possibility of reverter in the minerals
if the ownership in place theory is follov/ed) is not challenged
or in any way brought into issue. No one denies this interest
of the United States; no one challengea it. That the state courts
as well as the federal courts are available ^o bear the burden
of most of these controversies should go a long way to dispel
any reluctance, real or pretended, to leave such litigation
in the courts where the time-tested precedent of the patent
cases shows that it belongs,
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FAHY, CIRCUIT JUDGE: The Secretary of the Interior and
John Snyder appeal from a judgment of the District Court
that appellee The Texas Company, assignee of Thomas G,
Dorough, is the holder of a val id oil and gas lease on
forty acres of land in North Dakota and that Snyder should
surrender for cancellation a lease to him on the same acreage,
Dorough applied April 19, 1943, for a noncompetitive oil
and gas lease on some 2000 acres, including the forty acres
in question. His application was made pursuant to the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 41 Stat, 437, as amended,
30 U.S.C. § 181 (1952), and was filed with the Bismarck,
North Dakota, district land office of the Bureau of Land
Management, Department of t;he Interior. The Act of 1920
authorizes the leasing of "public domain lands," and for pur-
poses of an oil and gas lease the forty acres were of that
character. By letter of January 25, 1949, however, the regional
office of the Bureau at Billings, Montana, informed Dorough
that most of the land covered by his application, including
the forty acres, was "acquired land" and not public domain
land, "Acquired li^nd" is not in "terms authorized to the leased
under the Act of 1920, and, furthermore, an application for
a lease on land of that character should be made with the
Washington office of the Bureau, Dorough, in reply to the
letter of January 25, asked the regional office to forward
his application to Washington, "with a request that it be
treated as an application for an oil and gas lease on acquired
lands, thus retaining its filing time and date priority,"
On December 1, 1951, the United States, through the Bureau,
issued to Dorough an oil and gas lease on this land, denomin- »
ated a "Lease of Oil and Gas Lands Under the Act of August 7,
1947," That Act, 61 Stat, 913, 30 U,S,C, § 351 (1952), in
terms authorizes the leasing only of acquired land.
Previous to the lease to Dorough, but after his application,
Snyder filed with the Bureau of Land Management in Washington
an application for an oil and gas lease on the same forty acres
as well as on other land, all as public domain land and "pursuant
and subject toV the Act of 1920, His application was transmitted
to the office at Billings, Montana, It was at first rejected
as to the forty acres in question but this action was revoked
upon a showing that those acres were in fact public domain
land. On April 24, 1953, a lease that had been issued to
1. The forty acres are described as follows:
Whi SW^i of Section 7 in Township 153 N,, Range 95W,,
5th Principal Meridian, McKenzie County, North Dakota

Snyder under the 1920 Act, was amended to include the forty
acres, thus giving Snyder a lease to the sane land and
under the same Act as Dorough had originally sought for him-
self. The Bureau found that when the United States had
issued a land patent on these forty acres in 1940 it had
reserved the oil and gas rights, Tlie land had been recon-
veycd to the United States two years later, but the oil and
gas had remained at all times part of the public domain and
were not "acquired."
On February 16, 1954, the Chief, Division of Minerals of the
Bureau, at the request of Snyder, and without notice to Dorough,
cancelled the lease to Dorough of December 1, 1951, on the
ground that it had been erroneously issued under the Act of
1947, which was not available for the leasing. of public domain
land. On appeal to the Secretary of the Interior, taken by
The Texas Company and Dorough, the Bureau decision was affirmed
on the grounds hereinafter stated,^ The Texas Company there-
upon filed its complaint in the District Court, The parties
there stipulated that the court should determine whether the
Texas Company or Snyder holds the valid lease on the forty
acres, except that "the stipulation was not to apply in the
event that the Court's decision was based upon a finding
that the puirported cancellation of plaintiff's lease was
not effective because of the lack of a judicial proceeding,"
The District Court ordered the Secretary "to restore the
lease to The Texas Company and directed Snyder to surrender
his lease for cancellation by the Secretary. We affirm as to
the restoration of the lease to "The Texas Company on the
ground that judicial proceedings were essential to cancella-
tion of the lease to Dorough, The Texas Company's assignor.
Dorough 's original application, as we have seen, was filed
under the proper statute, the Act of 1920, But the Secretary
ruled that when the regional office by its letter of January
25, 1949, mistakenly inform-ad Dorough that the forty acres
were not public domain' land but acquired land which could not
be leased on his application made pursuant to the 1920 Act,
and Dorough then asked the regional office to forward his
application to Washington to be treated as an application
for a lease on acquired lands, which was done, thereafter
"Dorough 's only valid application for the disputed tract
was
. • • an acquired land application filed in accordance
with the pertinent regulations • . • with the Bureau of Land
Management in Washington," while Snyder's application,
though filed after Dorough 's, was in proper form for public
domain land. In this situation the Secretary ruled that
Dorough 's application "was not a proper one and failed
2. Dorough also petitioned for reinstatement of his lease,
which was denied.

to earn him the preference right to a public land oil and
gas lease," and Snyder became the first qualified applicant
with a proper application. See 30 U.S.C. i 226 (1952).
In court the position of the Secretary and Snyder is that
the cancellation of Dorough's lease by the Secretary was
reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, the District
Court could not reach a different conclusion on the rnerits,
A number of cases are cited, including Ickes v, Underv7ood,
78 U. S. App. D.C. 396, 141 F.2d 546. This position pre-
supposes a cancellation within the administrative competence
of the Secretary, But we think that Dorough's lease, even if
in some manner irregular, had acquired a status which necessitat-
ed judicial proceedings for its outright cancellation. Among
the powers conferred by Congress upon the Secretary we find
none which authorized his action in this case. If it exists
it must be implied, for it is nowhere expressed. And the
relevant considerations weigh against implying theppower. The
Secretary leased the forty acres to Dorough under the 1947
Act after Dorough had been advised, though no doubt erroneously,
that his application under the 1920 Act was under the wrong
Act, No other application preceded his. Seventeen months
after leasing to Dorough the Secretary leased exactly the
same land to Snyder, but under the 1920 Act, Ten months passed i.i
and then at Snyder's request a division chief, without notice
to Dorough, cancelled Dorough's lease, action which was affirmed
administratively by the Secretary after appeal to him and a
hearing. The courts are asked to hold that this action cannot
be set aside except for arbitrariness, and that in determining
the question of arbitrariness the factual findings of the
Secretary cannot be disturbed at all. We are not justified
in implying the existence of such a method for disposing of
the matter. In the absence of other provision by Congress,
and we find none, the controversy was in an area for judicial
determination in litigation initiated either by the Secretary
or by other parties. It has long been held that once a patent
to public land is granted by the United States it may be can-
celled only by a court' in original proceedings, and not merely
on limited judicial review of previous administrative cancel-
lation. United States v. Stone, 69 U,S, (2 Wall.) 525;^
Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U,S, (13 Wall,) 72, 84-87; Noble v.
Union River Logging R.R, , 147 U,S, 163, 176; and cases
3. In this case the Court said:
Patents are sometimes issued unadvisedly or by mistake,
where the officer has no authority in law to grant them
or where another party has a higher equity and should
have received the patent. In such cases courts of law
will pronounce them void. The patent is but evidence

cited; Chandler v. Calunnet and Heda llining Co., 149
U.S. 79;^ Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R., 234 U.S. 669, 692,
710; and see Witback v. Hardeman, 51 F.2d 450, 452 (5th Cir.)
;
Lane v. Watts, 234 U.S. 525, 540, affirming Lane v. Uatts,
41 App. D.C. 139; United States v. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S.
315, 365; Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 32. We see no difference
in principle here. We need not consider whether Congress
could provide otherwise consistently with due process of
law. See, however. Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. , supra,
at p. 176. Congress has not provided otVierwise. Congress
of a grant, and the officer who issues it acts ministerially
and not judicially. If he issues a patent for land reserved
from sale by law, such patent is void for want of authority.
But one officer of the land office is not competent to
cancel or annul the act of his predecessor. That is a
judicial act, and requires the judgment of a court.
4, There was jurisdiction in the Secretary to have issued the
lease originally to Dorough, notwithstanding he did so
mistakenly under the 1947 Act rather than the 1920 Act.
See Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. , supra, at 176.
In other words, the mistake was not a jurisdictional one,
5, This case is of special interest. Defendant claimed title
throu^ an 1855 patent issued under an 1852 Act of Congress
providing for the grant of land to Michigan to finance a
canal. Plaintiff claimed through an 1887 patent X7hich he
contended was issued under an 1850 Act of Congress pro-
viding for grant of land for swamp drainage. Plaintiff at*-
'C'- .'tempted to prove by oral testimony that the land in question
was in fact swamp land. The Court excluded this evidence,
but went on to say that assuming the evidence were compe-
tent, that the land were sxjamp, and that
the State, in patenting the demanded premises to
the canal company, acted under mistake or mis-
apprehension as to the character of the land so
conveyed, still so long as that patent remains
uncancelled and unrevoked by the State, it must
be held that its legal effect was and is. to
pass whatever title the State had to the tract
in question, however that title may have been
originally acquired by the State.
It is well settled that the State could have im-
peached the title thus conveyed to the canal company
only by a bill in chancery to cancel or annul it,
either for fraud on the part of the grantee, or
mistake or misconstruction of tlie law on the part
of its officers in issuing the patent, and until so
cancelled or annulled it could not issue to another
party any valid patent for the same land.

6has provided in 30 U.S.C, I 188, not here ripplicable, for a
judicial and an administrative proceeding for cancellation
of leases in the circumstances and in the manner there stated.
This is persuasive that Congress intended cancellation in
other circumstances to be accomplished in a manner usual to
the disposition of conflicting claims to the same interests
stemming from a common grantor.
We think McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 96 U.S. App. D.C. 313, 226
F.2d 35, does not decide that administrative cancellation
was available to the Secretary in the present case. There
we held that the Culbertson lease should be cancelled, and
ordered the Secretary to cancel it. We did say also that
the Secretary could have cancelled in the situation there
presented, but the fact is the cancellation was ordered by
the court as the result of a judicial proceeding, and not on
review of administrative cancellation. In Call .v. Richfield
Oil Corp., 101 F. Supp. 972 (S.D. Cal.), also relied upon by
the Secretary, it seems that the court thought that if a
lease x^ere not valid it could be cancelled by the Secretary
administratively; but this leaves unanswered the question as
to hov7 the question of validity, or of appropriate relief in
case of invalidity or irregularity, is first to be adjudicated.
Even if we were to assume a measure of invalidity, it would
not follow that all rights of the lessee xjeve terminated. In
other words, in the circumstances here presented—and we do
not deal with all possible situations~the ultimate rights
and duties of the parties, including the United States, cannot
be so molded initially by administrative corrective action as
to be subject only to the limited judicial scrutiny applicable
x^rhere an administrator acts within his sphere of discretion,
as in United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co, v, Hitchcock,
190 U,S, 316, and like cases.
It is our opinion that the lease to Dorough could be cancelled
against his will, or that of his assignee, only by judicial pro-
ceedings. In viev7 of this we affirm the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court insofar as it orders the Secretary to restore the
lease to The Texas Company, Dorough 's assignee, without pre-
judice, however, to further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion, initiated either by the Secretary or by
others. Since we do not prejudge the outcome of such pro-
ceedings it is necessary to vacate that part of the judgment
of the District Court which orders Snyder's lease to be sur-
rendered for cancellation.
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(Sec. 17 Noncompetitive Public Domain Lease
)
The undersigned hereby offers to lease all or any of the lands described in item 2 that are available for lease, pursuant and subject to
the terms and provisions of the act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat. 437, 30 U. S. C. sec. 181), as amended, hereinafter referred to as the
act, and to all reasonable regulations of the Secretary of the Interior now or hereafter in force, when not inconsistent with any express
and specific provisions herein, which are made a part hereof.
I- ^'- -\
I Mrs. I
1. Miag ._ _ _ _..






2. Land requested: State Ckiunty T. : R. Meridian
Total Area Acres
3. Land included in lease: State County T. : R. : Meridian
(Offeror does not fill in this block) Total Area Acres Rental retained f
4. Amount remitted: Filing fee $10, Rental $ , Total $
B. Undersigned certifies as follows:
(a) Offeror is a citizen of the United States. Native bom Naturalized __ Corporation or other legal
entity (specify what kind); _
__
(b) Offeror's interests, direct and indirect, do not exceed 200,000 acres in oil and gas options or 246,080 chargeable acres in
options, offers to lease and leases in the same State, or 300,000 chargeable acres in leases, offers to lease and options in each leas-
ing district in Alaska, (c) Offeror accepts as a part of this lease, to the extent applicable, the stipulations provided for in 43
CFR 191.6. (d) Offeror is 21 years of age or over (or if a corporation or other legal entity, is duly qualified as shown by state-
ments made or referred to herein), (e) Offeror has described all surveyed lands by legal subdivisions, all lands covered by pro-
tracted surveys by appropriate subdivisions thereof, or all unsurveyed lands not covered by protracted surveys by metes
and bounds, and further states that there are no settlers on unsurveyed lands described herein.
6. Offeror Q is D is not the sole party in interest in this offer and lease, if issued. (// not the sole party in interest, statements
should be filed as prescribed in Hem 6 of the Special Instructions.)
7. Offeror's signature to this offer shall also constitute offeror's signature to, and acceptance of, this lease and any amendment thereto
that may cover any land described in this offer open to lease application at the time the offer was filed but omitted from this lease
for any reason, or signature to, or acceptance of, any separate lease for such land. The offeror further agrees that (o) this
offer cannot be withdrawn, either in whole or in part, unless the withdrawal is received by the land office before this lease, an amend-
ment to this lease, or a separate lease, whichever covers the land described in the withdrawal, has been signed in behalf of the
United States, and (6) this offer and lease shall apply only to lands not within a known geologic structure of a producing oil or gas
field at the time the offer is filed.
8. If this lease form docs not contain all of the terms and conditions of the lease form in effect at the date of filing, the offeror further
agrees to be bound by the terms and conditions contained in that form.
9. It is hereby certified that the statements made herein are complete and correct to the best of offeror's knowledge and belief and are
made in good faith.
Offeror duly executed this instrument this day of , 19
(Leasee stgnature) (Lessee signature)
(Altorney-ln-fact)
This lease for the lands described in item 3 above is hereby issued, subject to the provisions of the offer and on the revene side hereof.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
By
(Blgning offloer)
Effective date of lease _
(TltW (D«t«)
THIS OFFER MAY BE REJECTED AND RETURNED TO THE OFFEROR AND WILL AFFORD THE OFFEROR NO PRIORITY
IF IT IS NOT PROPERLY FILLED IN AND EXECUTED OR IF IT iS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY THE REQUIRED DOCUMENTS
OR PAYMENTS. SEE ITEM 9 OF GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
18 U. S. C. sec. loot makes it a crime for any person knowingly and willfully to make to any Department or agency of the United
Stales any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations as to any matter within its jnrlsdiction.
Thij form may be reproduced provided that the copies are exact reproduction oo one sheet of both tides of this official brm. Id accordance with the provlsloos of 43 CFR 193.43 (a).
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ftnd opor^tion of th* .r«a fiald. or pool, or p.tl ther«»f. emhrnrinR th* ! »^,lapda inrludad hrr»>in aa tha S^raUry of Ih* Intwior may then dei.r- ' ^
miD« lo b* pnctirabU and atrmm^Ty or adviuble. *hiph pUn ahalldaqualaly protwi Ih* f.|hU of all parliaa in ii>t«rt.t. iocludlDs tha
,'.'"
bu'l''('erV','nV«lii
Ih) Hill Tffo dt —
































(p) ftntnmd or »egriv»trd /oitd*.—
-If Moy (
•»" is BfflbraMd ia « r*a*rvaiian or mci
>urpiM», tA ronduri oprfattoaa iharf^mUi
•Q.i,.P,„,ni. a, may l>em«.I.. |,y (h« ll.rrrir,
t-ruic-iii>n and tur of fha Uod foi
Wl«]. I
. fara
a of thia 1-a
,- b« c
lb»r«nr. lo tbc Inuor wh<
tbii PHrairaph, iinnn <lii
tioa by ih* pub I tha aipiration
> laoda of Lha Lait«.l iitata. aod i
t^ may fll« tuch oth«'r bond a
I by the tihlio ttl th<





of wajU. liTaith an.y •ci/r(« o/ irorkmm
—To
r» in drillint and prodiicirtc tha wHIi h«rMn
M ',\"^U "•*".''•'"*'" '••"porarilv i> trani«1
amac« to dtrpoaiia
I of wai
II and prod I(c) Wril».—n) 1
tha Iau«d land fro
th« laaaor. or Un>li
rat*, or aa to which the royal
funda than arv thoae nf
ad produ^lioD, with
Survay, to coinp*niatr>
loM of royally thmuKl
DirMtor: (2) at th« oh
«(4U in conformity with an>
allotmxnu aflMtins (ha field
aituatod. which i( authoriifvl
the Secretary of tha Interior
wriUos to dnil and produce
ir mineral depoaiu. for (^ona«rvation of iind coDMrvatioa of the proMrty for futura produe-
ewlih and "tMy of workmen and employ-
'nllfl in acoordaoca with
r. to drill and prodi
well fipdcinK or prodi
r area in which the IsnimhI lan(
id aanctioned by applicable law
Weill
mplly
- a ordar that the
b« properly and timely devalop«d and produced
Dod operatins praetica.
(d> Rmt<iU and royolUtt.—ll) To t>ay rental
•mount or value of produotioD raooovad or aold (r
Renlot*.—To pay tba leaaor in advaocs
Ibc ntlaa:
(a) If the landi arc whcHv outaide the known jteolofie alractu:












That the lenee ahall not b*. held
ncra*ioned by eauneii beyond
r»j and ttagra. frtrdom of jiu.




1 employeea complete freedi
e workmen and employMa at le.
of I e<l St.
» pay when due. all
> of the 8ute or the
liicail from the land*
aaaeta of the le—ee; to accord
base, and to pay
arh moDlb lo the
D aaotial rcoUl at tba follow
of I
fractio
n the knottn feoloxic




of a orofluctn* oti nr itaa rtrld
;
in Bennnin* with the firat Icj
all or part of the land m in
each year therrafter, prior
lanrfa leaaed, 12 per acre or iraeiion oi an aerr.
(ii) If thia leaae t> «omtniltMl to an approvrd cooperati
plan which inctudca a well capable of producirut oil <
conUini a s«nrrat provnion for allocation of prtirfi
rental prescribed for the retnective Icaae year*
graph (al of thiia, - - ' - -
Uxnxmvm Toyaltu.—('ommonc
or after a discovery on the l^aed
a ninimuro roynlty of tl per ne
of each leaw year, or the diffei
dunne the year if \*r« than $1
royalty of SI per acre, provided that if this b
mtim royally ehall he payable only on the parUcipaUnc acreaie and
raoiAl aball b" payable on the oonparticipatini acrearo as providad
undei thiicontn





with the perfonnanK of
year b«ciniwith the laasi
d. to pay tha tcaxor in lietj of rcnUI.
r irartioo thereof at the expiration
> between the actual royally paid
ind the pretcritxid minimum
Ntiu
rnxniDh Ih) (
<ve.l c i frc
Ihptes r 13i< Ity on the
Thr I
icl, the lessee affreea as follow*
'ill not discriminate SKsinst any employee or applicantiM of race, erred, eelor. or national origin. Th* leasee
action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
durinic employment, without renard to their race, creed,
in. Such action ahall include, but not be limited'to. ih^
It. upgradinn. dvjnotlon or ii-ansfer. reciuHmenl or re-
.
IsynfT or lermmal.on; rates of pay or other formi of
<ur,n fortrainlnit. includinirapprenlitrihip. The leasee
i iruoua plscca. avsilshle to tmp!oyee« and applicanli
u. be provided by the Conlraclinir Officer artling forth
•
i ndiscnminstton clause.
II, in sll solicitations or adveilisrmenis for cmploycej
e that alhqunlifled apphcants will rr-
> raee. creed, color, or
r i.x
.
- „ Ien^e.1 | „.„ i-.„„..
rilh tha Oil and Gas Oparaiinc Heculalions «30 f'Flf Pi. 221).
(2) It is esprevly axreed that the Secretary of the Interior may
••tablish reanonable minimum valuee for purpoar* of computinK royally
OD any or all oil, ««», natural caiioline, and other proilucu abtnine>l
IrOBi <as. due cortti Herat ion beinc c'ven to the hisbc^t pnce paid for a
part or for a maiority of production ol like (iimlity in the same field
pnce received by the Icaaee. to poste>l pricw. and lo other rele-
latters and, whenever appropriate, after notice and opporttinity
1OT2:. of March fl. lyiil. and of the rule*, irirulalifi
.
ihi- l'i-r*tdrnt'> rominiitce on Efiunl rmp'ovmcnt ()ppiii-tiini(>
(.'>] The leure will fu< nixh ult infni muiioi. n-.d • |..i I* re
tivc Order No. IfHiZJ of Mnich r., lOrtLendhy Ihc ritlea, reeuin
nf the aaid Commitlce. or pursuant fhrrrto. and will permit ar
ri-cni Ii, snd accounu by the contraciinjf uKmcy nnd the C'oi
[Kist* of mvcatlRSIIon to ajceriain compliance with aueh tx
>n«.omlordcn
M to his bonk<t.
nittee for pur-
irl Orrrrtdtna fo»iU(t»a.—Not to ereate averndioK royalliea lo eicaaafive pciceni rjrrtii ».s i.il.eraiae authorlaed by the raculationa
.}/>*/.,-,,...
'/Wti-re-Todebveruptothalawor
•-HI oriier n t
.1 ^tv\ laaaod inHudiDi all inprovaixMa*
I- .nte-tn--. Tvdtion ol pro<lucin« wella,
la) Aosem*../ ,'.: ' ^.i^.—The risht ta p»rmit for ioiat or
era! uae ra.en.eiH. or ..sbia-.f-way. ineludinc easemeota in tuoa^
tin, through, or iii the Innda leawed. occupied, or used aa tnav ba






. >ell. otbarwlaaui.paM oi tne aurfaoe of tha leaw«j lands uitder esiating law or lawahereafter enacted, insofar as said surface is not neceaaa'v for the illof the leuee ,n the eatrael.on and removal of the oil and gas ibaes^a.or to di.po*e of any re-ourca in aucb Uod* which w.ll not uoTsaaonablyinterfere aith operations under thia leas*, —"*
..J«L^V.'^''ri'' '"4^ P^'-.-^ull power and authority to promul-
^r , t. I !^ 1 / ' order. o#ce«.ry to in.ur. the sale of tha productwoo( ihe leased lands to tha Unitad IKtalea and to the public at raaaooablspr.c« to prot«t the .nier-U of the Umtad SUtaa. t^^i^tmonopoly, and to aalaguard the public wetfar*.
(d) H.liMW — I'ur.Marl f., ^Mrnn 1
--Mh' ^M ...
.„„-,„k,1 ,(„ * , . , h
and Ihc riithl t.- ,• ...1 hrl, ,n, fr->- ..11 ... '....^,', ..,. , . '.. . ,' , ' ' !''
lnl,iror'"ln".'
all ga> contain ..
on the leased i.i>.
may provide, whcieu|«.i.
subiUnlial delay in lh<' 1
chaser thcreaf The h.-..^.
from which the helium ti^.
not reasonably eompenaateil, san- f.^r thr value r,t the htliurn fSlracted Tli'-
lessor further rwerva the right lo crarl. maintain, and operate any si^ an
reduction works and olher equipment necesaary for Ihe eatraction of hAxxim
-All right! pursuaot to smUob 36 of iba aat.
ue of production.
40 of the act to purcbaas
rJ/li*- '*""'"" ""J pro-iur-io r«(r.,(..„M.-ll „ agre*) that theaio 01 prospecting and developing and the Quantity and rata nf f»»rv-
Juction from the land, covere.1 by thi» ttuue .hull br' ub.ect to c«o^^
In the public in»«est by the Secretary nf the Ipi.rior. and ,n the eaercIU
1.1 h..
...<ifmenj Jhe Secreury may take into eon».derstioo. amoog olhar
State lawa. and regulaiioiM taauerl thereunder or
nong operators regulating etther driltiog or pr«-
n. the Kecreury of the Intarior. or
1-a.leral officer or agency ao author-
or modify from time lo lime, tha rata




parson, eonimillee. or Stat*
1 in the unit plan, may altar
jroapectiog and developnien
from the landa covered by thit
Sac. 6. SurreNdrrandfrrmin
this leaae or any legal aul3divL
ifKca a written relinquiahmen
a of the date of filing aubjc^t
.od his surety to tnaki
od to plara all wella on the land
reculai
/(eoa**—The leasae may surreodar
lereof by filing in the proper land
-iplieate. which nhall b« effective
oolinued obltgaiion of the Ir^ae
of all accruefl rentala and royalUas
be retiariuiibeil in condition for





month next lollnwing the cnlendar
responsible or held liable for the U
in value, such royalties on protlui-lii
hly on the ln*t day of the culemlnr t
r month in which proiluced. When
1
I roynlty products ahalt be .lelivercd ii
premieas where produced without
ahnll bo due
f he
re:u>oniil>ly may be n
ebercfiuired tobnblix
n.\ the hist di.y of ih
lontli in which proilui
' because the lea
»lty. 01
iMai
otheiInterior, to make rrnlnl. roy
the or.ler of the Bureau of lji.._
in the regulation 43CPR Itfl.l3. If there li do well o
capable of producing oil or gas in paying aunnlitie*.
rental 00 or before the anoiveraary dale ahnll autom
the lease by operaiion of law. However, if the time
on a day in which the proper oflfiee to receive pnymt
mem nli:dl be deemed timely if made on Ihe neit offi
it) ContrarU for diipotal of produrU.—To file with
Supervisor of the (leuloKiciil Survey not later than :
effective dale thereof any contract, or evidence of ot
(or the sale or dispoaul of oil. gaa. natural gaioline. nc
of the leaaa.) land. Prorufrd. That oothmg in any
other arrangement aball be con^lrucl aa modifying 1
A, GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
1. This offer must be filled in on a typewriter or printed plainly in ink
and miut be signed in ink.
2. This form is to be used in offering to lesae noncompetitively public
domain landa or oil and gas deposits reserved to the United Slates in
disposals of such lands for the' purpose of drilling, mining, extracltng,
removing and disposing of oil and gas deposits, except helium. This
form should not be used in offering lo leusc acquired lands or lands on
a known geologic structure of a producing oil or fias field.
3. Offers to Tesic may be made by individu.
who are citiiens of the United States, and by
4. This offer must be prepared in quintuplicale and filed in the
proper land office. The term 'filing" means Ihc actual receipt of the
offer in the proper land office. If ihc land is in a Sute for which theit
is no land ofHc*. the offer must be filed with the Bureau of Land Man-
agement, Department of the Interior, Washington 2S, D. C. See 43
CPR 192.42(b). If less than five copies are filed, the offeror will have
30 days from the dale of first filing to file Ihe other required copies,
failing in which the offer wilt be rejecled and returned to the offeror
and Will afford no priority.
5. The offeror shall mark one of the copies first filed at the lop with
the word "oriifinal." If that is not done, thr manager will so mark
copy. If there la any variation m the land deachptions among
^d "original" shall govern as to the lands




, rehaser of such products, to
ibout discrriminatioQ the oil or gas
pany not the owner of any
r sellini
of the Go
[ a lease or purchasing
producu under the proviaions ol tha act, or under
>( Ihe act of August 7. 1047 (61 SUt. 013. 30 U. S. C, aac.
351),
(o) Land* palrnlrd xeilh oil and oiu dtponU rttrtrrd to t\t Vnittd
SlaUi.—To comply with all statutory reQuircments and regulationa
thereunder, if the landa embraced herein have been or ahatl hereafter
Iw diapo'ed of under the lawa re-erving to the United Suio the depoaiU
of oil and giu thereto, aubject lo such conditions as are or may her^ter
be provided by the lawa reaerving such oil or gas.
menta needed for producing
machinery, tiructuren. aiMl equip
providecl, which are alloweil to ren
(fi) In tha evml nf the lmi«-a noncompliance with the Nnndiacriminallon i .. '*'^'^- !' />"*"»'''/ malmalr. n
Isose of thia conli-act or with any of the said ruies. i«Kulationa. or orders . * ?*0"»*"o >»• »»"» laasa. or il.'
hia contract may be csnceled in whole or in part and thi^lMsee may be de- i If **" !?f* P««-adiDg s«l«»n. thr I.
lared ineliRiblc for further Government conlracta in accordance with pr«c,- I ?l!i*.n "i.'
^'"^ o| 00 daya U,.,
Iui«s authoiiajd in Escculive Older No. l«9as of March G. 1361. and auch - rnacninery. equipment,
ithcr sanctions may be imposed and n'mcdics invoked as pimidcd in the laid
Kxecutive Order or by rule, rcgutBlioii, or order of the Preiulenl's Commili™
' on Equal Emctoynienl OpportHriily. or na othnwite provided by law.
("1 Thf leasee will includt the pioviaions of the forvKoingpiirairi'nph* (It
ihioiigh (fl) in every aubcontiael or pmchaae oidcr unless eiimptt-d by ruW.
regulationt, or orders of the President's Commiltw on Kqual Fniplo>-m.'nl
OpixiHunity issued pursuant lo wcKnn MS of Ivxrculive Onkr No. ltW2-i of
Mnrch C. IBCl, so (hat such prnv-ialons will be binding upon each subcontractor
01 vendor. The tetaee will tnkc »ueh sclion with rea|K-ct lo any subcontract
or purchase order as the conlrnctinn agi'iicy may direct as a mrana of enforv-
inr such proviaions. includjnir sanction* fnr noncnmplianee : Pmiiiltil. haur'tr.
thut in the event the Icawsc becnmrs involved in, or ia threatened with, litiga-
tion with a Bubconlraetoi or vendor aa a i-esult of such diieclion by the con-
tracting agency, the lessee may requ»»t the United Siatea to enter into such
tiliiratinn to protect the intcreils of the Unit*d Stales.
(m) /4K.i;/nmriil ol uil ami yii< Iriitc or infrrof tAcrcm.—As required
by applicable law, to file for approval by the lessor any instrument of
transfer made of this lease or any interest therein, including assign-
ment* of i-ecord title, operating agr*«mcnU and subleases, working 01
royalty interests, within 90 duys from the date of final execution thereof
(n) Pipehnea (o purcAate or conrey al reaaonabU rate* and wilkoul
diicri Nil no/ton,— If owner, or operalor. or owner of a controlling inlarwt
in any pipeline or of any company operating the same which may ba
iperatad acceuible to the oil or gaa derived from landa
thereof pursuant
leg* a I aoy
K from tha p
'ibilN
J of th<
eatanaioo thereof aa may be granted beeauae 1
ditiotu throughout aaid perio<1: Proridtd, That the li
any or alt of such proparty whore so dlroctafl by the tewoi
Sw 7. /rof*c./,.,.q. tn f.,,, ,, .Uf.vitt. If the li-»s.x; *h*\\ n.
any of the provmum of xU jot ., li... ,. y:)j\„.,.- k,, ,, u,,,k , .
or make ilrfault tti thi- pi 1
1
(eaeept that of payment > i
nation of the lease), aii<f
after service of written n.i
by the Secretary of the InRi J . ,, ,_
that if thia lease covers lsn<U kii»'<<.
the lease may be canceled only by ^u
in section 31 of the act; bm this p
the eierciae by (tir W-i,.,t of an) .
,





lay pena.1 or sueb
8ar. 8, Meira and •tu-ceaaora-m-tntfr/al.—It ia furthar agraad that
each obligalioa hereunder aball eaieod to and ba binding upon and
ev*ry benefit beraof shall inure to. the heirs, esacuLors. adnuBislrilora.
agraed that 00 Member
mtBioner, aft«r his alee-
'
has qualified and during
gent, or amployae ol tha
d <a 43 CFR 7.4 (a) (II,
any baoaifit
a of thr
-nfoie/uf inlo-e«|.— It ,. alM> lurltier
[at* to, Congroaa, or Resident Com
liniment, or either before or after ha
ance id of&ce. and tbal no officer, a
I of lha Interior, eicepi aa pruvidei
litted to any ahare or part in this U
INSTRUCTIONS
i», the a
1 needed in furnishiri
the fl
eovtred bv t
6 If additional api
information tl should be prepared
attached and made part of this offer u. lease, auch additional sheets
to b« atUched lo each copy of the form submitted.
7. If any of the land described in item 2 of the offer ia open lo oil and
f«a l»a»e filing when the offer is filed but is omitted from the lease for
any reason and ihei-eafter becomea available for leasing to the offeror
the original lease will be amended to include the omitted land, unless,
before (he issuance of the amendment on Form 4-116.'J. the land ofRce
receives' ihe withdrawal of ihe offer as to auch land or an election to
receive a separate lease to be dated in accordance with 43 CFR 192.4Ua,
in which case such separate lease will be isaucd- If the lease ia amended
the rerital charged and the lease lenn will be the same as though the
added land had been included in the original lease when It was iBsued.
8. As an incident to the assignment of the whol* internal In all or
any part of the lease, the lessee may aasirn the whole interest in all or
any part of the offer. As an incident to the assignment of an undivided
requirements of icction 192.42a or the lands are not entirely within an area
of 6 mile* uguaie or an area of fi aurveyed sections in length or width, (b)
The toul aercaRc exceeds 2,i60 aciea. except where the role of approximation
applies or li less ihsn 640 sci-es or the equivalent of a section and la not within
the exceptions in 43 CFR l»Z.42(d). This doca not apply where the toUl
acreage 11 in error by not more than 10 percent, (c) The full filing fee and
the first year's rental do not accompany the offer, the rental payment to be for
the total acreage if known, and if not known, for the total acreage computed
legal subdi
I 10 pet (dl F-
fractii
vided fractional interest in
of assignments of an offer
agre«a to be bound by the offer
be signed by the assignee. In oth.
will not be approved prior lo the
drpoiits covered by said assignmenl
whole offer. Applications
' nclude a statement that the assignee
- the estent it is assigned and must
r inaUnces aasignmenU of the offer
uuance of a lease for the lands or
aph -13 CFt:
offer I I. f or agent m behalf
offri
• iiii^nt Dvci ihe offer>ii ,;ii
reapfit 1 . [. and by the evident. Ml
192.42(orJl.at,i) -uf,- .ui,n,rr,i hy the principal ( offers ) i» iioi fik.l «ithm
15 days after Ihe filing of ihe offer. (e) The offer is signed by a guai-dian
or truitee in behalf of n minor and Is not accomiianied by the evidence re
quired by « CFR l92-42(eM^) (fl Us* thai, n^, cii" "I \hf nfTtr ar*
filed and the copies lacking are not received in Tr.
tion of 30 days from the dste of receipt of tlu
is noncompliance with item (5)(a) and (>(ci 1
offeror will be given an opportunity to file :< 1
service of the rejection, and the fee and rental : . :. ill
be applied to the new offer if the new offer show, ihi- M-nal and i»cpipt imm-
beri of the old UlTri The advance rental will be leturned unlt«s within Ihe
30-day periotf .nathcr offer ia filed.
a SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS'
lUm I.— Total area of land requested should be shown in aci«« in
space provided al bottom of item 2. That area, except where the rule
[>f approximation applies, must noi exceed 2,5fiO acr«« or be leas than
640 afres or the equivalent of a section except as provided in 43 CFR
192.42 (d) All of the land mull be within a fi-mile square or an area
of 6 surveyed secnona in length or width. The deacHption of surveyed
and unsurveycd lands, or lands covered by protracted surveys must
conform to the proviaions of 43 CFR 192.42a.
Htm J.—This space ia not to be filled in When lease is issued this
spaca will conUin the idantiflcalion of Ihe leased area and total acres.
/(«m i.—The total amount remitted should include a flO filing fee
and the first year's rental of the land requested al the rate of &0 cents
an acra or fraction thereof, any fraction being counted as an additional
acre. The SIO filing fee m retained aa a service charge, even in Ihose
eases where the offer to lease la completely rejected. In order 10 piolecl
the offeror's priorittcs with respect to the land requested, it is impuitsnt
that the renUl payntent suhmttted with the nfl'er be (ufRcirnt to cow-i
all the land r«iu.-.<»te,i at ih.- rat,- ,if '.11 .-,r.i. .„ ,^r^ ... r ..




, , 1 , ,
thee
therefrom: and Ihe provisions nf See. 3741 of lha TlsiJsaJ
Statulea ot the Unilwl Slalea. aa amended (41 U. S. C. Sm. 23) and
Sees. 431. 432 and 433. Title 18 U. 8. Code, relating to oootraeU, atw
into and form a part of thia leaaa ao far aa tba same mmr ba apptioabUu
will be returned. Where at the time the lease is to be Issued, the land
applied for or any part of it is within a known geologic structure of a
producing oil or gaa field, the lessee will be billed for the additional
renul of |i.$0 an acre on all the leased land as the yearly renUl on such
lands la 12 per acre.
Hem S In).—Offeror will indicate whether a citizen by birth or
naturalitation. If production is obtained under this teaaa or allocfttwl
to il. the citiienship status of the lessee will be verified.
If offeror is an unincorporated association (including a partnerahip),
the offer must be accompanied by a slatenwnt giving the same showing
aa to citiienship and holntngaof lU members as required of an individu«r.
If offeror is a corporation it must submit a statement containing tha
fallowing information: the State in which it ii incorporated; that it is
aulhoriied to hold oil and gas leases and that the officer executing
the lease is authonied to act on behalf of the corpoiation in sucn
matters: the percentage of the voting stock and of all of the stock
owned by aliens or those having addresses outside the United States.
Wheiv auch ownership is over 10 percent, additional information may
be required b) the Rureau before the lease is issued or when pi-oduction
is obtained. If any appreciable percentage of the stock is held by aliens
of Ihc excepted clsis trie application wtiT be denied. If 20 percent or
more of the stock of any class is owned or controlled by or on behalf
of any one stockholder a separate showing of his cidzenship and hold-
ings must be furnished.
ll<rm 5 (b).—Acreage included in unitited leases and leaaea subject
to cerUin development contracts approved by Ihe Secretary under
authority of section 17(b) ii not chargeable.
Ittm S (c).—Whenever applicable the stipulations referred to will be
made a part of this lease and will be furnished the lessee with the lease
when issued. The forms covering them with a brief description are as
follows: 4-216 Stipulations for lands where the surface control is under
the juriftdictinn of the Department of Agriculluie; 4-^67 Landa poten-
" ally II I. I . Ji Lands within the flow limits of a i-eserx-oir
te; -t ;i -'Lin the drainage area of a constructed rescr-
DU, 4 ><.t*-n for power purposes: and 4-1383. Wildlife
efuc - C^Ktrdinalion Lands. Whenever other stip-
latuN , , , :>
-^iee will be re<iuired to agree to them before
IC ISiNii.iL-, "f (h,. l.jxe
/leni s Ic).— If thcie aie aettlrra attach a sheet giving the name and
post-oflice address of each and description of the landa claimed by melH





DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
OIL AND GAS LEASE
(COMPETITIVE -PUBLIC DOMAIN LANDS)
Act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat 437) as amended (30 U.S.C. Sec. 181 et seq.)
Land Office
Serial Number
This Indenture of Lease, entered into, as of
, 19 , by
and between the United States of America, through the Bureau of Land Management, hereinafter called the Lessor, and
hereinafter called the Lessee, under, pursuant, and subject to the terms and provisions of the act of February 25, 1920,
(41 Stat. 437) as amended (30 U.S.C. Sec. 181 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the act, and to all reasonable regulations of
the Secretary of the Interior now or hereafter in force when not inconsistent with any express and specific provisions herein,
which are made a part hereof,
WITNESSETH:
SEC. 1 Rights of Lessee. That the Lessor, in consideration of rents and royalties to be paid, and the conditions and
covenants to be observed as herein set forth, does hereby grant and lease to the Lessee the exclusive right and privilege to
drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of all the oil and gas deposits, except helium gas, in or under the following-
described tracts of land situated in the field:
containing acres, more or less, together with the right to construct and maintain thereupon all works, buildings,
plants, waterways, roads, telegraph or telephone lines, pipelines, reservoirs, tanks, pumping stations, or other structures
necessary to the full enjoyment thereof, for a period of five (5) years, and so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying
quantities; subject to any unit agreement heretofore or hereafter approved by the Secretary of the Interior, the provisions of
said agreement to govern the lands subject thereto where inconsistencies with the terms of this lease occur.
SEC. 2. In consideration of the foregoing, the Lessee
agrees:
(a) Bonds. (1) To maintain any bond furnished by the
Lessee as a condition for the issuance of this lease.
(2) To furnish prior to beginning of drilling opera-
tions and maintain at all times thereafter as required by the
Lessor a bond in the penal sum of $10,000 with approved
corporate surety, or with deposit of United States bonds as
surety therefor, conditioned upon compliance with the terms
of this lease, unless a bond in that amount is already being
maintained or unless such a bond furnished by an operator of
the lease is accepted, or unless a bond has been filed under
43 CFR 192.100(e) applicable to this lease.
(b) Cooperative or unit plan. Within thirty (30) days of
demand, or, if the leased land is committed to an approved
unit or cooperative plan and such plan is terminated prior to
the expiration of this lease, within thirty (30) days of demand
made thereafter, to subscribe to and to operate under such
reasonable cooperative or unit plan for the development and
operation of the area, field, or pool, or part thereof, embracing
the lands included herein as the Secretary of the Interior may
then determine to be practicable and necessary or advisable.
which plan shall adequately protect the rights of all parties
in interest, including the United .States.
(c) Wells. (1) To drill and produce all wells necessary
to protect the leased land from drainage by wells on lands not
the property of the Lessor, or lands of the United States leased
at a lower royalty rate, or as to which the royalties and rentals
are paid into different funds than are those of this lease; or
in lieu of any part of such drilling and production, with the
consent of the Director of the Geological Survey, to compen-
sate the Lessor in full each month for the estimated loss of
royalty through drainage in the amount determined by said
Director; (2) at the election of the Lessee, to drill and
produce other wells in conformity with any system of well
spacing or production allotments affecting the field or area in
which the leased lands are situated, which is authorized and
sanctioned by applicable law or by the Secretary of the
Interior; and (3) promptly after due notice in writing to drill
and produce such other wells as the Secretary of the Interior
may reasonably require in order that the leased premises may
be properly and timely developed and produced in accordance
with good operating practice.
(d) Rentals and royalties. (1) To pay rentals and royal-
ties in amount or value of production removed or sold from the
leased lands as set forth in the rental and royalty schedule
attached to and made a part hereof.
(2) It is expressly agreed that the Secretary of the
Interior may establish reasonable minimum values for purposes
of computing royalty on any or all oil, gas, natural gasoline,
and other products obtained from gas, due consideration being
given to the highest price paid for a part or for a majority of
production of like quality in the same field, to the price re-
ceived by the Lessee, to posted prices, and to other relevant
matters and, whenever appropriate, after notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard.
(3) When paid in value, such royalties on production
shall be due and payable monthly on the last day of the
calendar month next following the calendar month in which
produced. When paid in amount of production, such royalty
products shall be delivered in merchantable condition on the
premises where produced without cost to Lessor, unless other-
wise agreed to by the parties hereto, at such times and in
such tanks provided by the Lessee as reasonably may be re-
quired by the Lessor, but in no case shall the Lessee be
required to hold such royalty oil or other products in storage
beyond the last day of the calendar month next following the
calendar month in which produced nor be responsible or held
liable for the loss or destruction of royalty oil or other
products in storage from causes over which he has no control.
(4) Rentals or minimum royalties may be waived,
suspended or reduced and royalties on the entire leasehold or
any portion thereof segregated for royalty purposes may be
reduced if the Secretary of the Interior finds that, for the
purpose of encouraging the greatest ultimate recovery of oil
or gas and in the interest ofconservation of natural resources,
it is necessary, in his judgment, to do so in order to promote
development, or because the lease cannot be siiccessfuUy
operated under the terms fixed herein.
(e) Payments. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary
of the Interior, to make rental, royalty, or other payments to
the Lessor, to the order of the Bureau of Land Management at
the places mentioned in the regulation 43 CFR 191.12. If
there is no well on the leased lands capable of producing oil
or gas in paying quantities, the failure to pay rental on or
before the anniversary date shall automatically terminate the
lease by operation of law. However, if the time for payment
falls on a day in which the proper office to receive payment
is closed, payment shall be deemed timely if made on the
next official working day.
(f) Contracts for disposal of products. To file with the
Oil and Gas Supervisor of the Geological Survey not later than
thirty (30) days after the effective date thereof any contract,
or evidence of other arrangement, for the sale or disposal of
oil, gas, natural gasoline, and other products of the leased
land: Provided, That nothing in any such contract or other
arrangement shall be construed as modifying any of the provi-
sions of this lease, including, but not limited to, provisions
relating to gas waste, taking royalty in kind, and the method
of computing royalties due as based on a minimum valuation
and in accordance with the Oil and Gas Operating Regulations.
(g) Statements, plats, and reports. At such times and in
such form as the Lessor may prescribe, to furnish detailed
statements showing the amounts and quality of all products
removed and sold from the lease, the proceeds therefrom, and
the amount used for production purposes or unavoidably lost;
a plat showing development work and improvements on the
leased lands; and a report with respect to stockholders, in-
irestments, depreciation, and costs.
(h) Well records. To keep a daily drilling record, a log,
and complete information on all well surveys and tests in
form acceptable to or prescribed by the Lessor of all wells
drilled on the leased lands, and an acceptable record of all
subsurface investigations affecting said lands, and to furnish
them, or copies thereof, to the Lessor when required. All
information obtained under this paragraph, upon the request of
Lessee, shall not be open to inspection by the public until
the expiration of the lease.
(i) Inspection. To keep open at all reasonable times for
the inspection of any duly authorized officer of the Depart-
ment, the leased premises and all wells, improvements,
machinery, and fixtures thereon and all books, accounts,
maps and records relative to operations and surveys or inves-
tigations on the leased lands or under the lease. All infor-
mation obtained pursuant to any such inspection, upon the
request of the Lessee, shall not be open to inspection by the
public until the expiration of the lease.
(j) Diligence, prevention of waste, health and safety of
workmen. To exercise reasonable diligence in drilling and
producing the wells herein provided for unless consent to
suspend operations temporarily is granted by the Lessor; to
carry on all operations in accordance with approved methods
and practice as provided in the Oil and Gas Operating Regu-
lations, having due regard for the prevention of waste of oil
or gas or damage to deposits or formations containing oil,
gas, or water or to coal measures or other mineral deposits,
for conservation of gas energy, for the preservation and con-
servation of the property for future productive operations, and
for the health and safety of workmen and employees; to plug
properly and effectively all wells drilled in accordance with
the provisions of this lease or of any prior lease or permit
upon which the right to this lease was predicated before
abandoning the same; to carry out at expense of the Lessee
all reasonable orders of the Lessor relative to the matters in
this paragraph, and that on failure of the Lessee so to do the
Lessor shall have the right to enter on the property and to
accomplish the purpose of such orders at the Lessee's cost:
Provided, That the Lessee shall not be held responsible for
delays or casualties occasioned by causes beyond Lessee's
control.
(k) Taxes and wages, freedom of purchase. To pay when
due, all taxes lawfully assessed and levied under the laws of
the State or the United States upon improvements, oil and gas
produced from the lands hereunder, or other rights, property
or assets of the Lessee; to accord all workmen and employees
complete freedom of purchase, and to pay all wages due work-
men and employees at least twice each month in the lawful
money of the United States.
(1) Nondiscrimination clauses. In connection with the
performance of work under this contract, the Lessee agrees
as follows:
(1) The Lessee will not discriminate against any
employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed,
color, or national origin. The Lessee will take affirmative
action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that em-
ployees are treated during employment, without regard to their
race, creed, color, or national origin. Such action shall
include, but not be limited to, the following: employment, up-
grading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment
advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms
of compensation; and selection for training, including ap-
prenticeship. The Lessee agrees to post in conspicuous
places, available to employees and applicants for employ-
ment, notices to be provided by the contracting officer setting
forth the provisions of this nondiscrimination clause.
(2) The Lessee will, in all solicitations or advertise-
ments for employees placed by or on behalf of the Lessee,
state that all qualified applicants will receive consideration
for employment without regard to race, creed, color, or
national origin.
(3) The Lessee will send to each labor union or
representative of workers with which he has a collective bar-
gaining agreement or other contract or understanding, a
notice, to be provided by the agency contracting officer,
advising the said labor union or workers' representative of
the Lessee's commitments under this section, and shall post
copies of the notice in conspicuous places available to em-
ployees and applicants for employment.
(4) The Lessee will comply with all provisions of
Executive Order No. 10925 of March 6, 1961, and of the rules,
regulations, and relevant orders of the President's Committee
on Equal Employment Opportunity created thereby.
(5) The Lessee will furnish all information and
reports required by Executive Order No. 10925 of
March 6, 1961, and by the rules, regulations, and orders of
the said Committee, or pursuant thereto, and will permit
access to his books, records, and accounts by the contracting
agency and the Committee for purposes of investigation to
ascertain compliance with such rules, regulations, and orders.
(6) In the event of the Lessee's non-compliance with
the nondiscrimination clauses of this contract or with any of
the said rules, regulations, or orders, this contract may be
cancelled in whole or in part and the Lessee may be declared
ineligible for further Government contracts in accordance with
procedures authorized in Executive Order No. 10925 of
March 6, 1961, and such other sanctions may be imposed and
remedies invoked as provided in the said Executive Order or
by rule, regulation, or order of the President's Committee on
Equal Employment Opportunity, or as otherwise provided
by law.
(7) The Lessee will include the provisions of the
foregoing paragraphs (1) through (6) in every subcontract or
purchase order unless exempted by rules, regulations, or
orders of the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity issued pursuant to section 303 of Executive Order
No. 10925 of March 6, 1961, so that such provisions will be
binding upon each subcontractor or vendor. The Lessee will
take such action with respect to any subcontract or purchase
order as the contracting agency may direct as a means of
enforcing such provisions, including sanctions for non-
compliance: Provided, however, that in the event the Lessee
becomes involved in, or is threatened with, litigation with a
subcontractor or vendor as a result of such direction by the
contracting agency, the Lessee may request the United States
to enter into such litigation to protect the interests of the
United States.
(m) Assignment of oil and gas lease or interest therein.
As required by applicable law, to file for approval by the
Lessor any instrument of transfer made of this lease or any
interest therein, including assignments of record title, opera-
ting agreements and subleases, working or royalty interests,
within ninety (90) days from the date of final execution
thereof.
(n) Pipelines to purchase or convey at reasonable rates
and without discrimination. If owner, or operator, or owner of
a controlling interest in any pipeline or of any company opera-
ting the same which may be operated accessible to the oil or
gas derived from lands under this lease, to accept and convey
and, if a purchaser of such products, to purchase at reason-
able rates and without discrimination the oil or gas of the
Government or of any citizen or company not the owner of any
pipeline, operating a lease or purchasing or selling oil, gas,
natural gasoline, or other products under the provisions of
the act, or under the provisions of the act of August 7, 1947
(61 Stat. 913; 30 U.S.C, Sec. 351).
(o) Lands patented with oil and gas deposits reserved to
the United States. To comply with all statutory requirements
and regulations thereunder, if the lands embraced herein have
been or shall hereafter be disposed of under the laws re-
serving to the United States the deposits of oil and gas there-
in, subject to such conditions as are or may hereafter be pro-
vided by the laws reserving such oil or gas.
(p) Reserved or segregated lands. If any of the land in-
cluded in this lease is embraced in a reservation or segregated
for any particular purpose, to conduct operations thereunder
in conformity with such requirements as may be made by the
Director, Bureau of Land Management, for the protection and
use of the land for the purpose for which it was reserved or
segregated, so far as may be consistent with the use of the
land for the purpose of this lease, which latter shall be re-
garded as the dominant use unless otherwise provided herein
or separately stipulated.
(q) Protection of surface, natural resources and improve-
ments. To take such reasonable steps as may be needed to
prevent operations from unnecessarily: (1) causing or con-
tributing to soil erosion or damaging any forage and timber
growth thereon; (2) polluting the waters of reservoirs, springs,
streams, or wells; (3) damaging crops, including forage, tim-
ber, or improvements of a surface owner; or (4) damaging
range improvements whether owned by the United States or by
its grazing permittees or lessees; and upon conclusion of
operations, so far as can reasonably be done, to restore the
surface to its former condition. The Lessor may prescribe the
steps to be taken and restoration to be made with respect to
lands of the United States and improvements thereon.
(r) Overriding royalties. Not to create overriding royal-
ties in excess of five percent except as otherwise authorized
by the regulations.
(s) Deliver premises in cases of forfeiture. To deliver
up to the Lessor in good order and condition the land leased
including all improvements which are necessary for the pres-
ervation of producing wells.
SEC. 3. The Lessor reserves:
(a) Easements and rights-of-way. The right to permit for
joint or several use easements or rights-of-way, including
easements in tunnels upon, through, or in the lands leased,
occupied, or used as may be necessary or appropriate to the
working of the same or of other lands containing the deposits
described in the act, and the treatment and shipment of
products thereof by or under authority of the Government, its
Lessees or Permittees, and for other public purposes.
(b) Disposition of surface. The right to lease, sell, or
otherwise dispose of the surface of the leased lards under
existing law or laws hereafter enacted, insofar as said sur-
face is not necessary for the use of the Lessee in the
extraction and removal of the oil and gas therein, or to dis-
pose of any resource in such lands which will not unreason-
ably interfere with operations under this lease.
(c) Monopoly and fair prices. Full power and authority
to promulgate and enforce all orders necessary to insure the
sale of the production of the leased lands to the United States
and to the public at reasonable prices, to protect the interests
of the United States, to prevent monopoly, and to safeguard
the public welfare.
(d) Helium. Pursuant to Sec. 1 of the act, as amended,
the ownership and the right to extract helium from all gas
produced under this lease, subject to such rules and regula-
tions as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior.
In case the Lessor elects to take the helium the Lessee
shall deliver all gas containing same, or portion thereof
desired, to the Lessor at any point on the leased premises in
the manner required by the Lessor, for the extraction of the
helium in such plant or reduction works for that purpose as
the Lessor may provide, whereupon the residue shall be
returned to the Lessee with no substantial delay in the
delivery of gas produced from the well to the purchaser
thereof. The Lessee shall not suffer a diminution of value of
the gas from which the helium has been extracted, or loss
otherwise, for which he is not reasonably compensated, save
for the value of the helium extracted. The Lessor further
reserves the right to erect, maintain, and operate any and all
reduction works and other equipment necessary for the
extraction of helium on the premises leased.
(e) Taking of royalties. All rights pursuant to Sec. 36 of
the act, to take royalties in amount or in value of production.
(0 Casing. All rights pursuant to Sec. 40 of the act to
purchase casing, and lease or operate valuable water wells.
SEC. 4. Drilling and producing restrictions. It is agreed
that the rate of prospecting and developing and the quantity
and rate of production from the lands covered by this lease
shall be subject to control in the public interest by the
Secretary of the Interior, and in the exercise of his judgment
the Secretary may take into consideration, among other things.
Federal laws. State laws, and regulations issued thereunder,
or lawful agreements among operators regulating either
drilling or production, or both. After unitization, the Secre-
tary of the Interior, or any person, committee, or State or
Federal officer or agency so authorized in the unit plan, may
alter or modify, from time to time, the rate of prospecting and
development and the quantity and rate of production from the
lands covered by this lease.
SEC. 5. Surrender and termination of lease. The Lessee
may surrender this lease or any legal subdivision thereof by
filing in the proper Land Office a written relinquishment, in
triplicate, which shall be effective as of the date of filing
subject to the continued obligation of the Lessee and his
surety to make payment of all accrued rentals and royalties
and to place all wells on the land to be relinquished in con-
dition for suspension or abandonment in accordance with the
applicable lease terms and regulations.
SEC. 6. Purchase of materials, etc., on termination o/
lease. Upon the expiration of this lease, or the earlier termi-
nation thereof pursuant to the last preceding section, the
Lessee shall have the privilege at any time within a period of
ninety (90) days thereafter of removing from the premises all
machinery, equipment, tools, and materials other than improve-
ments needed for producing wells. Any materials, tools,
appliances, machinery, structures, and equipment subject to
removal as above provided, which are allowed to remain on
the leased lands shall become the property of the Lessor on
expiration of the 90-day period or such extension thereof as
may be granted because of adverse climatic conditions
throughout said period: Provided, That the Lessee shall
remove any or all of such property where so directed by
the Lessor.
SEC. 7. Proceedings in case of default. If the Lessee
shall not comply with any of the provisions of the act or the
regulations thereunder or of the lease, or make default in the
performance or observance of any of the terms hereof (except
that of payment of annual rental which results in the auto-
matic termination of the lease) and such default shall con-
tinue for a period of thirty (30) days after service of written
notice thereof by the Lessor, this lease may be canceled by
the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with Sec. 31 of
the act, except that if this lease covers lands known to
contain valuable deposits of oil or gas, the lease may be
canceled only by judicial proceedings in the manner provided
in Sec. 31 of the act; but this provision shall not be construed
to prevent the exercise by the Lessor of any legal or equit-
able remedy which the Lessor might otherwise have. Upon
cancellation of this lease, any casing, material, or equipment
determined by the Lessor to be necessary for use in plugging
or preserving any well drilled on the leased land shall
become the property of the Lessor. A waiver of any particu-
lar cause of forfeiture shall not prevent the cancellation and
forfeiture of this lease for any other cause of forfeiture, or
for the same cause occurring at any other time.
SEC. 8. Heirs and successors in interest. It is further
agreed that each obligation hereunder shall extend to and be
binding upon, and every beneHt hereof shall inure to, the
heirs, executors, administrators, successors, or assigns of
the respective parties hereto.
SEC. 9. Unlawful interest. It is also further agreed that
no Member of, or Delegate to. Congress, or Resident Com-
missioner, after his election or appointment, or either before
or after he has qualified and during his continuance in office,
and that no officer, agent, or employee of the Department of
the Interior, except as provided in 43 CFR 7.4(aXl), shall be
admitted to any share or part in this lease or derive any
benefit that may arise therefrom; and the provisions of
Sec. 3741 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as
amended (41 U.S.C. Sec. 22) and Sees. 431, 432, and 433,
Title 18 U.S.C, relating to contracts, enter into and form
a part of this lease so far as the same may be applicable.











OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LEASE
THIS AGREEMENT, Made thii th» day o*
, 19 , b«tw
_h«ralnaft«r oolted leuor (wh«th«r on* or moro) and
heroinoftar ealltd Uucti
1. LoMor. In consideration of
_Dollor» ($ ), m hand paid, the
receipt ond sufficiency of which it hereby acknowledged, and of the royalties herein provided and of the agreements of the lessee herein conroined, hereby gronti,
leases ond lets exclusively unto lessee for the purpose of tnvesligoting, making seismograph or other geophysical or geological tests ond surveys, exploring, prospecting,
drilling, mining and operating for and producing oil, gos and all other minerals, injecting gas, woters, other fluids, ana air Into sub-surfoce strata, loying pipe lines,
storing oil, building tanks, power stotions, telepnone lines, and other structures and things thereon to produce, save, take core of, treat, process, store ana transport
•old minerols and other products manufactured therefrom the following described land (n
County, Texos, to-witi
In the event a resurvey of said lands shall reveal the existence of excess ortd/or vacant lands lying odjacent to the above described tond and the lessor, h)i
heirs or assigns shall by virtue of hit ownership of the lands above described hove preference right to acquire said excess and/or vocant lands, tfien in that event
this lease shall cover arid include such excess and/or vacant londs which the lessor, his heirs or ossigns shall have the preference right to acquire by virtue of his owner-
•hip of the land above described as and when acquired by the lessor; and the lessee shall pay the fessor for such excess and/or vocant lof>ds or the lome rote per acre
OS the cosh consideration paid for the ocreoge hereinabove mentioned. For the purpose of calculating the rental payments hereinafter provided for, said land U
••tlmated to comprise . ..., .. acres, whether it actually comprises more or less.
2. This lease shall remain in force for a term of ten years from this dote (called "primary term") ond as long thereafter as oil, gos, casingheod gos, cosingheod
gasoline, or any of them is produced from said land or land with which said land is consolidated.
3. The royalties to be poid by lessee ore: (o) on oil saved at the well, one-eighth (1/6) of that produced and saved from the land, some to be delivered at
the wells or to the credit or lessor in the pipe line to which the wells may be connected: lessor's interest in either case shall beor its proportion of any expense for
treating oil to make it morketoble as crude, and of ony trucking expenses incurred In morketing; (b) on gos, including cosingheod gas and all gaseous substances
produced from said land and sold or used off the premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or othe-' products therefrom, the market volue at the mouth of the well
of one-eighth ()/8| of the gas so sold or used, provided thot on gas sold ot the well, the royalty will be one-eighth ()/8| of the omount realized from such sale;
Ic) on all other minerals mined and marketed, one-eighth (1/8) either in kind or value at the well or mine, at lessee's election, except on sulphur, the royalty sholl
be One Dollar ($1.00) per long ton; (d) where gas from a gas well, or wells, on sold land or on land with which said land is consolidated, is not sold or used,
whether before or after the expiration of the primory term, lessee snail, unless and until this leose be maintained in force and effect under other of its provisions,
poy or tender to lessor, or poy or tender or deposit into the depository bonk nomed in Porograph 4 hereof, or any successor thereof or named therefor, in the manner
therein provided, as royalty, on amount equal to the delay rental provided for in this lease for ocreoge then held under this lease by the party making poymenr or
tender, some being payable annually ot the end of eacn year during which such gos is not sold or used, computing su'-h one year periods from the date when the
lost or oil gos weTis located on the land above described, or on land with which it Is consolidated, is finolly shut in. Should the shut-in period be less thon one
year, lessee shall pay as royalty, in the manner hereinabove provided, a prorata part of the onnuot amount provided for, computed to the nearest monrh, some being
payable at the end of one year from the commencement of the shut-in period. Pending and until the poyoble date of, and while said royolty is so poid, tendered or
deposited, it shall be considered ond held under oil provisions of this lease, thor gos is being produced in poying quantities from the leased premises. For the purpose
of this paragraph, the term gas well sholl include a well, or wells, capable of producing noturol gos, condensate or any other gaseous substance, ond wells clossified
as gas wells by any gcvernmental authority.
4. If operations for drilling or mining ore not commenced on said land or on land consolidated therewith on or before one (1) year from this dole, this leas*
^all terminate as to bo^ parties, unless on or before one {)) year from this date lessee shall pay or tender to the lessor or to th* credit of lessor in the depository
bank herein named, a rental of DoHors ($ I which shall cover the
privilege of deferring commencement of such operations for a period of one {!] year. In like manner and upon like payments or tenders, onnually, the commence-
ment of operations for drilling may be further deferred for successive periods of one (1) year each during the primary term. Payment or tender may be mode to th*
lessor or to the —_ ... .Bank of
which bonk, or any successor thereof, shall continue to be the agent for the lessor and lessor's successors and assigns, if such bonk (or any successor bonk) shall foil,
liquidate, or be succeeded by another bonk, or for ony reason fail, or refuse to occept rental, lessee shall not be held in default until thirty (30) days ofter lessor
•hall deliver to lessee a recordable instrument moking provision for onother method of poyment or tender, and ony depository chorge is a hobllity of the lessor. The
payment or tender of rental and shut-in gos well royalties moy be mode by check or draft of lessee, moiled or delivered to said bank or lessor, or either lessor. If
more than one, on or before the rental paying dote.
5. Lessee Is hereby granted the right to consolidote or unitize this leose. the land covered by it or any port or parts thereof at to all strata or any stratum «rlth
any other land, lease, leases or parts thereof os to all strata or any stratum for the production of oil, gas. or any other mineral. Consolidotion in one or more in-
stances shall not exhaust the rignt of lessee hereunder to consolidate this lease or portion of the oil, gas and mineral estate Into oiher or different units. Uniti
consolidated for oil hereunder shall not exceed forty (40] acres plus a tolerance of ten per cent (10%) thereof, and units consolidated for gos hereunder shall not
exceed six hundred forty (640) acres plus a tolerance of ten per cent (10%) thereof, provided that if any Federal or Stote law. Executive order, rule or regulation
shall prescribe o spacing pattern for the development of the field or allocate o producing ollowoble on ocreoge per well, then any such units may embrace os much
additional acreage as may be so prescribed or as moy be used in such ollocation or allowable. Lessee shall file written unit designotions in the county in which the
premises are located. Such units may be designated either before or after the completion of wells. Drilling operations and production on any port of ine consolidated
ocreoge shall be treated as if such drilling operations were upon or such production was from the land described in this tease whether the well or wells be located
on the land covered by this leose or not. The entire acreage consolidated into a unit sholl be treoled for oil purposes, except the poyment of royolties on production
from the consolidated unit, as if it were Included in this lease. Commencement of drilling operations, drilling operations, drilling, reworking operations, a well copa-
ble of producing oil or gas ond/ot o welt producing oil or gas on any portion of a consolidated unit sholl hove the some force and effect os if such commencement
of drilling operations, drilling operations, drilling, reworkinq operations, well capable of producing oil or gas, and/or a well producing oil or gos located on lond
with which the land covered by this lease has been consoliaoted or is pooled shall have the same effect as if located on the land above described ond shall operate
to continue the oil and gas leasehold estate herein granted for so long as such drilling operotions, drilling, reworking operations, o well copoble of producing oil or
gos shall continue ond/or so long as o well producing oil or gas shall continue to produce oil or gas, or so long as the shut-in royally provided in Porograph 3 is
paid, tendered or deposited. This paragraph shall never be construed as a limitation or restriction of any other provision of this leose. In lieu of the royalties
nerein provided, lessor shall receive on production from a unit so consolidated only such portion of the royalty stipulated herein os the amount of his acreage placed
in the unit or his royalty interest therein on an acreage basis bears to the total acreage so consolidoted In the particular unit involved.
6. If prior to discovery of oil, gos or other minerals on said land or land consolidated therewith lessee should drill and abandon a dry hole or holes thereon.
or )f, after discovery of oil, gos or other minerals, the production thereof should cease from any cause, this lease shall not terminate if lessee commences reworking
or additional drilling operations within sixty |60) days thereafter, or (if it be wirhjn the primary term) commences or resumes the payment or tender of rentals or
commences operations for drilling or leworking on or before the rental paying dote next ensuing after the expiration of two (2) months from dore of completion and
abandonment of said dry hole or holes or the cessation of production. If a dry hole is completed and abandoned at any lime during the last fourteen (Mj months of
the primary term ond prior to discovery of oil. gas or other mineral on said land or land consolidated therewith, no rental payment or operations ore necessary In
order to keep the lease In force during the remainder of the primory term. If, at the expiration of the primary term, oil, gos or other mineral is not being produced
on said lona or land consolidated therewith but lessee is then engaged in operations for drilling, mining or reworking of any well or mine thereon, this lease shall
remain in force so long as drilling, mining, or reworking operations ore prosecuted (whether on the some or different wells) with no cessation of more than sixty (60)
consecutive doys. and if they result In production, so long thereafter os oil, gos or other mineral Is produced from sold land or lond consolidated therewith, in the
event o well or wells producing oil or gos in paying quantities should be brought In on adjacent land and within one hundred fifty (150) feet of and droining the
leased premises, lessee agrees to drill such offset wells as a reasonably prudent ooerotor would drill under the some or similor circumstances. The judgment or the
lessee, when not fraudulently exercised, in carrying out of the purposes of this lease sholl be conclusive
7. Lessee shall hove free use of oil, gos or>d water from said land, except water from lessor's wells and tanks, for alt operations hereunder, includina repres-
•uring, pressure maintenance, cycling, ond secondary recovery operations, and the royalty shall be computed after deducting any so used. Lessee shall hove th*
right ot any time during or after the expiration of this lease to remove alt property and fixtures pioced by lessee on said land, including the right to drow ond re-
move all cosing. When required by lessor, lessee will bury oil pipe lines below ordinary plow depth, and no well shall be drilled within two hundred feet (200 ft.)
of any residence or born now on said land without lessor's consent. Lessor shall hove the privilege, at his risk and expense, of using gos from any gas well on said
land for stoves and Inside lights In the principal dwelling thereon, out of any surplus gos not needed for operations hereunder.
8. The rights of either party hereunder may be assigned in whole or In part and the provisions hereof shall extend to the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors and ossigns, but no change or division in ownership of the land, rentals or royalties, however accomplished, sholl operate to enlarge the obligations or
diminish the rights of lessee. No such change or division in the ownership of the land, rentals or royolties, shall be binding upon lessee for ony purpose until such
person acquiring any Interest has furnished lessee with the instrument or instruments, or certified copies thereof, constituting his chain of title from the original lessor.
In the event ofan ossignment of this leose to a segregated portion of said land, the rentals poyoote hereunder, shall be apportioned os between the several lease-
hold owners ratably according to the surface area owned by each, and default In rental poyment by one shall not offect the rights of other leosehold owners here-
under. An assignment of this leose, in whole or in part, sholl to the extent of such assignment, relieve ond discharge lessee of^ any obligations hereunder, and If
lessee or ossignee of part or ports hereof shall foil or make default in the payment of the proportionate part of the rentals due from such lessee or assignee or fail
to comply with any other provision of the lease, such default shall not affect this lease insofar os it covers a port of said lands upon which lessee or any assignee
thereof shall moke payment of sold rentals.
9. Lessee shall not be liable for delays or defaults In its performonce of any agreement or covenant hereunder due to force mojeure. The term "force mojeure" as
employed herein shall mean: any ocl of God including but not limited to storms, floods, washouts, landslides, ond lightning; acts of the public enemy; wars, block-
ades, insurrection or rIotS; strikes or lockouts; epidemics or quarantine regulations; laws, acts, orders or requests of Federal, Stole, Municipal or other governments or
govemmentol officers or agents under color of outhorlry; freight emborgoes or failures; exhaustion or unavailability or delays In delivery ot any product, labor, service
or material. If lessee Is required, ordered or directed by any Federal, Stote or Municipal low, executive order, rule, regulation or request enocted or promulgated under
color of authority to cease drilling operotions, reworking operations or producing operations on the land covered by this lease or If lessee bv force majeure Is pre-
vented from conducting drilling operations, reworking operations or producing operations, then until such time os such law, order rule, regulation, request or force
majeure Is terminated and for a period of sixty (60) days after such termination eoch and every provision of this lease or implied covenant arising thereunder that
might operate to terminate it or the estote conveyed by it shall be suspended and Inoperative and this lease shall continue in full farce. If any period of suspen-
sion occurs during the primary term, the time thereof sholl be added to such term.
10. Lessor harsby worronts ond agr—* to defend the title to told land, and ogrset thot lessee, at Its option, may discharge ony tox, mortgage or other lien i^wn
sold land, ond in the event lessee does to. It shall be subrogated to toeh lien with the right to enforce tome and apply rentala and royalties occruing hereunder to*
word todtfying some. Without impoirment of lessee's rights under the worronty In the event of failure of title, )t Is ogreed thot. If lessor owns on interest In sold lond
less than the entire fee simple estate, then the royoliies and rentals to be poid lessor shall be reduced proportionately; should any one or more of the parties named
obove OS lessors fail to execute this leose, it sholl nevertheless be binding upon the porty or parties executing the some.
11. Lessee, its/hit successors ar>d assigns, tholl have tf>e right at any lime to surrender this lease, in whole or in pari, to lessor or hts heirs ar>d ossigna by
delivering or moiling o releose thereof to the lessor, or by plocing o release thereof of record in the county in which sold land Is situated, thereupon, lessee shall be
relieved from all obligotront, expressed or implied, of this agreement as to the ocreoge so surrendered, and thereafter the rentals poyoble hereunder shall be reduced
In the proportion that the ocreage covered hereby is reduced by said release or releases.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign the day and year first obove written.
THE STATE OF TEXAS SINGLE ACKNOWLEDGMENT
COUNTY OF
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority. this doy personally appeared ,
known to me to be the Identical person whose nomc
executed the some for the purposes and consideration therein expressed.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE this the








THE STATE OF TEXAS WIFE'S SEPARATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT
COUNTY OF 7





known to me to be the person whose rnime It subKrIbed
to the foregoing instrument, or>d hoving been examined by me privily and apart from her husband. or>d having the some fully exploined to her, she, the told
wife, acknowledged the same to be her act and deed, ond declared that she had willingly executed the same for the purpmses and consideration therein expressed,
and that she did not wish to retract it.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE this the -day of
.
Notary Public in and for
.
County, Texas
THE STATE OF TEXAS JOINT ACKNOWLEDGMENT
COUNTY OF y
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared
known to me to be the persons whose names ore subscribed to the foregolrtg




having been exomtned by me privily ar>d opart from her
husband, and hovino the some fully explained to her, she, the sold
act and deed and declared that she hod willingly signed the some
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE this the
acknowledged such Instrument to be her
for the purposes and consideration therein expressed arkd that the did not wish to retract it.
doy of , A. 0. 19_
Notary Public in ond for
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: This instrument was filed for record on the ^_^^^__^__^_^ doy of
10 a* o'rioffc M.,
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